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PREPARING FOR THE APOCALYPSE: A MULTI-PRONG 
PROPOSAL TO DEVELOP COUNTERMEASURES FOR 
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 
NUCLEAR THREATS 
Constance E. Bagley† & Anat Alon-Beck* 
 “Governments will always play a huge part in solving big problems. . . . They 
also fund basic research, which is a crucial component of the innovation that 
improves life for everyone.” 
—Bill Gates1 
 
 The false alarm of a Hawaiian nuclear attack in January 2018 is an example of 
the lack of U.S. preparedness for attacks using nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction. To address such threats, this Article proposes the establishment of a 
nationwide integrated defense of health countermeasures initiative (DHCI). DHCI is 
a multi-prong program to create a defensive triad comprising government, private 
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 1 COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS x (Rathnam Chaguturu ed., 2014) (alteration in original) [hereinafter 
Chaguturu]. 
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industry, and academia to develop countermeasures for health threats posed by 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Key elements of our 
proposal include the use of the government’s Other Transaction Authority to simplify 
procurement arrangements, the establishment of public-private partnerships with an 
information commons for the sharing and use of certain information and trusted 
intermediaries to protect proprietary information pursuant to cooperative research 
and development agreements, and the creation of a network of incubators sited in 
ecosystems of excellence. Although our proposal focuses on health countermeasures, it 
may be applied to other urgent national needs, such as rebuilding U.S. infrastructure. 
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INTRODUCTION: TWO MINUTES TO THE APOCALYPSE 
 On January 13, 2018, the Hawaiian government sent a text to its 
citizens announcing that a nuclear ballistic missile strike was imminent 
and instructing residents to seek shelter.2 It took more than thirty 
minutes for the government to announce that the notice was sent in 
error. Several days later, the Japanese government also sent an 
erroneous notice of an imminent attack, which it corrected several 
minutes later.3 Ballistic missile tests by North Korea4 have triggered 
memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the United States 
and the Soviet Union were on the brink of nuclear war. Had the Hawaii 
alert been accurate, where exactly were residents to seek shelter? Or are 
we back to the days of “duck and cover?” 
 In 2018, the Russian government used a weapons-grade nerve 
agent in an apparent attempt to assassinate a former spy and his 
daughter in Britain.5 In response, the U.K. Minister of Defence 
announced that the United Kingdom was spending £48 million to set up 
a chemical weapons defense center and was vaccinating thousands of 
British troops against anthrax.6 
 
 2 Adam Nagourney et al., Hawaii Panics After Alert About Incoming Missile Is Sent in 
Error, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/us/hawaii-
missile.html. 
 3 See Madison Malone Kircher, Japan Sends False Alert Over Impending North Korean 
Missile Attack, INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 16, 2018), http://nymag.com/selectall/2018/01/japan-
sends-false-missile-alert-about-north-korea-attack.html [https://perma.cc/THA6-LWPG]. 
 4 See Hasani Gittens, Trump to North Korean Leader Kim: My Nuclear Button ‘Is Bigger & 
More Powerful’, NBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/
trump-north-korean-leader-kim-my-nuclear-button-bigger-more-n834196 [https://perma.cc/
L3W7-JUYN]; see also Lindsey Bever et al., The Doomsday Clock is Now Just 2 Minutes to 




 5 See Novichok: Murder Inquiry After Dawn Sturgess Dies, BBC (July 9, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-44760875 [https://perma.cc/U8HE-DV56]. Two more Britons were 
poisoned by the same nerve agent in July 2018, causing at least one death. Id. 
 6 Ewen MacAskill, UK to Set Up £48m Chemical Weapons Defence Centre, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 14, 2018, 8:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/15/uk-set-up-48m-
chemical-weapons-defence-centre-gavin-williamson [https://perma.cc/B7JB-4ENF]. 
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 Anthrax-laced letters killed five and sickened fifteen Americans in 
2001.7 Syria used sarin gas on its own citizens in 2017 and 2013.8 If 
smallpox or other pathogens are weaponized, will we have adequate 
antidotes and vaccines available? What bacteriological cures or vaccines 
do we need to fight other weaponized “super bugs” or the spread of 
Ebola? 
 The fact is that governments worldwide are woefully unprepared to 
address threats of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) attacks and other emergency events that can cause massive 
human casualties.9 Such threats come not only from states at war using 
traditional military means of delivery, but also from non-state 
sponsored terrorist groups10 and naturally occurring diseases such as 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria and Ebola. Even though CBRN attacks are a 
 
 7 See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning 
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 622 (2002); Larry M. Bush et al., Index Case of Fatal Inhalational Anthrax Due to 
Bioterrorism in the United States, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1607, 1610 (2001), http://
www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa012948 [https://perma.cc/K5SU-X24E] (“Coworkers 
report that the patient had closely examined a suspicious letter containing powder on 
September 19, approximately eight days before the onset of illness.”); John A. Jernigan et al., 
Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, 7 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 933, 933 (2001), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/7/6/pdfs/
01-0604.pdf [https://perma.cc/YER5-MMEA] (“Epidemiologic investigation indicated that the 
outbreak, in the District of Columbia, Florida, New Jersey, and New York, resulted from 
intentional delivery of B. anthracis spores through mailed letters or packages.”). 
 8 Sarin Gas Used as Weapon in Syria, Says Chemical Weapons Watchdog, NBC NEWS (June 
30, 2017, 5:44 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/sarin-gas-used-weapon-syria-says-
chemical-weapons-watchdog-n778466 [https://perma.cc/9XJH-BTN6]. 
 9 See Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearings Before the Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs U.S. S.: Part I, 104th Cong. 
(1995); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ISC-559, PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION: ASSESSING THE RISKS 4–5 (1993). 
 10 See Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 9; PROLIFERATION 
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 9; see also David P. Fidler, Public Health and 
National Security in the Global Age: Infectious Diseases, Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 787, 817 (2003) (“The growth of terrorism as a phenomenon in 
international relations has presented realism with a dilemma because terrorism’s increased 
prominence suggests that (1) states do not have a monopoly on violence in international 
politics, and (2) the anarchical structure of the international system is not the only source of 
conflict and violence.”); Disruptive Technologies Push Bioterrorism to a Whole New Level, MED. 
FUTURIST (Sept. 21, 2016), http://medicalfuturist.com/disruptive-technologies-bioterrorism 
[https://perma.cc/7J9L-BBD7]. 
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recognized national security hazard and public health concern,11 
vaccines and therapeutics are available for only a small number of these 
threats, leaving large populations in the United States and elsewhere 
susceptible to such attacks.12 Successfully addressing this threat will 
require combining the “rapidly growing” and “complex [governmental] 
science and technology base”13 with the more nimble and innovative 
research and development capabilities of academic and industry 
scientists to speed up the adoption of the information technology 
innovations necessary to address CBRN threats. 
 Also key to developing effective countermeasures is promoting 
academic entrepreneurship14 and translational medicine15 by facilitating 
 
 11 See RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S ACHILLES’ HEEL: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, 
AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK 221–25, 228–29 (1998) (discussing concerns 
about nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorist attacks in asymmetrical conflict with the 
United States). 
 12 See HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Implementation 
Plan for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 72 Fed. Reg. 20117 (Apr. 23, 
2007); Jason Matheny et al., Incentives for Biodefense Countermeasure Development, 5 
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 228 (2007), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/20160519/
104953/HHRG-114-IF14-20160519-SD006.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XZ8-RQCN] (“[M]edical 
countermeasures are available for only a fraction of biological threats, including those 
representing the highest risk, as determined by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
threat assessments.”). 
 13 See generally NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 64 n.3 
(Richard R. Nelson ed., 1993). 
 14 Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Promoting “Academic Entrepreneurship” in 
Europe and the United States: Creating an Intellectual Property Regime to Facilitate the Efficient 
Transfer of Knowledge from the Lab to the Patient, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 3 (2015). On 
the different types of entrepreneurship, see Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social 
Entrepreneurship—Creating Shared Value Through the Lens of Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics, 
20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3064448. See also BILL AULET & 
FIONA MURRAY, MURRAY TR. CENT. FOR MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP, A TALE OF TWO 
ENTREPRENEURS: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN THE TYPES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE 
ECONOMY 3–4, 7–8 (2013), https://www.kauffman.org/-/media/kauffman_org/research-
reports-and-covers/2013/05/a_tale_of_two_entrepreneurs_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/23YA-
M5V3]. 
 15 See John C. Reed, NCATS Could Mitigate Pharma Valley of Death, 31 GENETIC 
ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (May 13, 2011), https://www.genengnews.com/gen-
articles/ncats-could-mitigate-pharma-valley-of-death/3662/?page=1 [https://perma.cc/S2PP-
U4GU]; see also Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual 
Property Strategies for Accelerating Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 
(2008) (proposing a two-tier regime for promoting “intensive, large-scale collaboration 
between academics, who possess unique skills in designing assays that can identify promising 
targets, and pharmaceutical firms that hold libraries of potentially useful small molecules as 
trade secrets, making them largely off limits to these same academic scientists”). One of the 
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the movement of medical research and discoveries from “bench to 
bedside.”16 The pharmaceutical industry is highly concentrated,17 and 
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) programs transferred to the National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences (NCATS) is the Molecular Libraries Probe Production Centers Network 
(MLPCN), “the first federally funded network to facilitate drug discovery by producing early-
stage small molecule leads.” Reed, supra. As Reed explained: 
These centers, most of which reside in universities and nonprofit research institutes 
across the U.S., provide federally funded researchers and even small biotechnology 
companies with access to drug discovery capabilities previously found only within 
large pharmaceutical companies. Those capabilities include large chemical libraries, 
assay development, ultra high-throughput robotic screening, cheminformatics, 
medicinal chemistry, project management, and  several other drug discovery-related 
services that typically don’t exist in academic labs and departments. 
Id. The NCATS Pre-Clinical Research Toolbox includes multiple small molecule libraries 
containing more than 100,000 small molecules generated by academic researchers. Compound 
Management, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., https://ncats.nih.gov/
preclinical/core/compound [https://perma.cc/66MS-RVGJ] (last updated Sept. 24, 2018). These 
molecules are available for researchers doing “high-throughput screening (HTS) of small 
molecule libraries against assays containing target proteins to identify promising compounds 
that may lead to patentable drugs.” Rai, supra, at 7. 
 16 See Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Pharmaceutical Public-Private 
Partnerships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 373, 373–74 (2014). 
[G]overnments in the European Union (EU) and the United States have taken bold 
steps to promote the movement of medical research and discoveries from “bench to 
bedside,” from the university laboratory to the patient. This “translation from the 
university laboratory to the healthcare sector [is facilitated by] the generation and 
support of start-ups, spin-offs, university-industry consortia, and other platforms.” 
For example, in 2014, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States 
announced the $230 million Accelerating Medicines Partnership, which will bring 
together scientists from ten large pharmaceutical companies, several research 
foundations and nonprofit organizations, and the NIH and Food and Drug 
Administration to collaborate on multi-year, open-source projects. These projects are 
designed to bridge the gap between (i) cutting-edge genomics, proteomics, imaging 
and other medical research, and (ii) the new drugs and diagnostics needed to fight 
type 2 diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, lupus, and rheumatoid arthritis. 
Id.; see also Editorial, NIH Tries a New Approach to Speed Drug Development, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nih-tries-a-new-approach-to-speed-
drug-development/2014/02/08/bf30ba18-8ea1-11e3-b227-12a45d109e03_story.html?utm_
term=.d5260b0a243f [https://perma.cc/847S-V6JZ]; Accelerating Medicines Partnership (AMP), 
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/research-training/accelerating-medicines-
partnership-amp [https://perma.cc/3J2T-KEYX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); Budget, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/about/budget/
budget.html [https://perma.cc/25G2-YNN6] (last updated Sept. 10, 2018); Alliances at NCATS, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., https://ncats.nih.gov/alliances/about 
[https://perma.cc/UTA6-FKFB] (last updated Sept. 10, 2018); About, EUR. FED’N FOR 
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“[t]he development of new pharmaceuticals is both high risk and high 
cost,18 with new drugs costing a billion dollars or more to bring to 
market.”19 
 There is a critical need to establish a nationwide integrated public 
health defense infrastructure, platform, and services initiative (the 
Defense of Health Countermeasures Initiative, or DHCI) to address 
such threats. The multi-faceted initiative for addressing the threats of 
CBRN attacks we introduce in Part IV builds on the successes of the 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL SCI., http://www.eufeps.org/about [https://perma.cc/4YZS-A4VD] (last 
visited Sept 30, 2018). 
 17 “From 2003 to 2007, roughly 80 percent of all pharmaceutical patents granted pursuant 
to the Patent Cooperation Treaty were issued to firms domiciled in just thirteen developed 
countries.” Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 377 n.24; see also Anand Grover et al., 
Pharmaceutical Companies and Global Lack of Access to Medicines: Strengthening 
Accountability Under the Right to Health, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 234, 238 (2012). 
 18 See AMERICA’S BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH COS., INFECTIOUS DISEASES: A REPORT 
ON DISEASES CAUSED BY BACTERIA, VIRUSES, FUNGI AND PARASITES 46 (2013); Matheny et al., 
supra note 12, at 229 tbl.1. (titled R&D Process for a Typical New Drug); Christopher P. Adams 
& Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 711 
(2004). 
 19 Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 379 (citing Valerie Gutmann Koch, Incentivizing the 
Utilization of Pharmacogenetics in Drug Development, 15 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 263, 274 
n.89, 276 (2012) (citing data showing that only 1 out of 60,000 compounds created by drug 
companies are highly successful, roughly 1 out of 6 drugs put into clinical trials are ultimately 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and more than 3% of drugs approved 
by the FDA are subsequently withdrawn due to negative side effects); PHARM. RESEARCH & 
MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 2011 PROFILE 10 (2011); Koch, supra, at 274 n.87 
(citing Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Cost of 
Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIO-SCIENCES 34, 36, 38–39 (2011)); ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, 
LUIGI ORSENIGO & FABIO PAMMOLLI, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 11–13 (2000).  
The productivity challenge in the pharmaceutical industry can be explained in part 
by an increase in R&D costs, reduced output, and depleted pipelines. Innovation 
losses in developing new drugs are increasing across the industry. Although the 
number of new, approved molecular entities has remained steady in the past ten 
years, the cost of new drug development has increased significantly in both the U.S. 
and the EU. The pharmaceutical industry in both the U.S. and the EU are looking for 
new ways to sustain pharmaceutical innovation and sell new products. At the same 
time, pharmaceutical enterprises suffer from inefficient internal processes to perform 
basic science and to assess the value of “proof of concept” inventions, especially when 
they involve distant knowledge domains. 
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 379. 
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Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), 
including their use of the federal government’s Other Transaction 
Authority (discussed in Part III), combined with the use of public-
private partnerships20 of the sort currently used by participants in the 
European Union’s Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI),21 the 
European Commission’s Action Plan Against the Rising Threats from 
 
 20 See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 14, at 3; Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 373–74. See 
also LINDA PARKER, THE ENGINEERING RESEARCH CENTERS (ERC) PROGRAM: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF BENEFITS AND OUTCOMES i, 1 (1997), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1998/nsf9840/nsf9840.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KQ58-MR7W] (describing the Engineering Research Centers Program, a 
government-university-industry partnership the National Science Foundation established in 
1985 to enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. firms by creating “long-term collaborations 
between universities and industry” and “new industry-relevant knowledge at the intersections 
of the traditional disciplines,” as well as by developing “a new generation of engineering leaders 
who are more capable of engaging successfully in team-based, cross-disciplinary engineering 
practice”). 
 21 The European Union’s Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), Europe’s largest public-
private partnership in the life sciences, was launched in 2008. See History—the IMI Story So Far, 
INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, https://www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi/history-imi-story-so-far 
[https://perma.cc/46B6-SCFM] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). It has a budget of €5.3 billion and 
has funded almost 100 projects. INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, http://www.imi.europa.eu 
[https://perma.cc/S872-XPGS] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). As Bagley & Tvarnø explain: 
The public party is the EU, represented by the European Commission (“EC”). The 
private party is the pharmaceutical industry, represented by the European Federation 
 of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (“EFPIA”) and its members. Among 
other projects, the IMI supports the European Lead Factory public-private 
partnership, an international consortium comprising thirty partners that have agreed 
to pool 500,000 chemical compounds; 300,000 compounds came from AstraZeneca, 
Bayer Pharma, Merck, Sanofi and three other member companies, and the balance 
will come from academia and smaller firms. 
Each IMI call[] for a project proposal involves open competition for funding as well 
as multiple stakeholders, including EFPIA, private pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
enterprises ranging from large to small, universities, hospitals, patient  organizations, 
and public authorities. Thus, universities and firms bid for government and industry 
funds to support research in areas of high medical need. All IMI contracts are subject 
to EU regulations, including those pertaining to the ownership of any resulting 
discoveries . . . . 
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 14, at 16–17. See Rogério Gaspar et al., Towards a European 
Strategy for Medicines Research (2014–2020): The EUFEPS Position Paper on Horizon 2020, 47 
EUR. J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 979, 980 (2012). For more information on the Innovative 
Medicines Initiative (IMI), see How IMI Works, INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, http://
www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi/how-imi-works [https://perma.cc/RDT3-KXRT] (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2018). 
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Antimicrobial Resistance,22 and by certain U.S. entities under the Bayh-
Dole Act.23 Our initiative also includes another component: identifying 
and generating ecosystems of excellence24 housing incubators that will 
bring together all the players and resources needed to support 
breakthrough multi-disciplinary discoveries. This new model will 
provide platforms, infrastructure, and services for both accelerating 
developments in countermeasure and creating a data commons. 
 The need for speed is very real. On January 25, 2018, the Bulletin of 
American Scientists moved up the Doomsday Clock thirty seconds to 
two minutes to midnight, its closest to the midnight apocalypse since 
1953 when the Americans and Russians tested the first hydrogen bombs. 
In a 2018 letter, the Union of the Concerned Atomic Scientists’ CEO 
and President Rachel Bronson stated: 
 
 22 See generally ELTA SMITH ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE EC ACTION PLAN AGAINST THE 
RISING THREATS FROM ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: FINAL REPORT (2016), https://
ec.europa.eu/health/amr/sites/amr/files/amr_final-report_2016_rand.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2UDV-PVXS]. 
 23 See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2018)). Multiple federal statutes have been enacted to foster innovation, 
including the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 
Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–14 (2018)); Small Business Innovation 
Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-219, 96 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 638 
(2018)); National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–05 (2018)); Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-564, § 201, 106 Stat. 4249, 4256–61 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631 
(2018)); America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, § 404, 124 
Stat. 3982, 4001 (2011) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 278k (2018)) (establishing the 
Manufacturing Extension Partnership); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, §§ 2521–26, 105 Stat. 1290, 1426–32 (1991) (Defense 
Industrial and Technology Base Initiative); High-Performance Computing Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-194, § 102, 105 Stat. 1594, 1598–99 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501–28 
(2018)); Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
564, 106 Stat. 4249 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2018)); Department of Commerce 
Advanced Technology Program (ATP), 15 C.F.R. § 295.1 (2018). For further details on this 
legislation, see Anat Alon-Beck, The Coalition Model, a Private-Public Strategic Innovation 
Policy Model for Encouraging Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth in the Era of New 
Economic Challenges, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 270, 284 (2018). 
 24 David J. Teece defines a “business ecosystem” as “a number of firms and other 
institutions that work together to create and sustain new markets and new products.” David J. 
Teece, Next-Generation Competition: New Concepts for Understanding How Innovation Shapes 
Competition and Policy in the Digital Economy, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 97, 104 (2012); see also 
JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
(2009). 
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In 2017, we saw reckless language in the nuclear realm heat up 
already dangerous situations and re-learned that minimizing 
evidence-based assessments regarding climate and other global 
challenges does not lead to better public policies. 
Although the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists focuses on 
nuclear risk, climate change, and emerging technologies, the 
nuclear landscape takes center stage in this year’s Clock 
statement. Major nuclear actors are on the cusp of a new arms 
race, one that will be very expensive and will increase the 
likelihood of accidents and misperceptions. Across the globe, 
nuclear weapons are poised to become more rather than less 
usable because of nations’ investments in their nuclear 
arsenals.25 
 President Trump has called for increasing the U.S. defense budget 
by 7% to $716 billion for fiscal year 2019,26 primarily to increase the 
offensive power of the U.S. military. This Article focuses on the 
defensive side of the ledger in a world where not only nation states, but 
also non-state actors or rogue states, like North Korea, can cause mass 
destruction and panic.27 
 Part I provides a brief summary of the role the federal government 
has played as a powerful market actor, particularly in the areas of public 
defense and innovation, including the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (formerly known as ARPA), the tremendously 
successful advanced research initiative that led to groundbreaking 
innovations, such as computer technology, the internet, and self-driving 
vehicles. 
 
 25 BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2018 DOOMSDAY CLOCK STATEMENT 1 (2018), https://
thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/2018%20Doomsday%20Clock%20Statement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B3LZ-XPAM] (Statement from Rachel Bronson, President and CEO, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists); see also Lindsey Bever et al., The Doomsday Clock is Now Just 2 Minutes to 




 26 Anthony Capaccio & Erik Wasson, Pentagon Wins as Trump Readies a $716 Billion 
Budget Request, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-01-26/trump-is-said-to-seek-716-billion-for-defense-in-2019-budget. 
 27 Id.; see also Fidler, supra note 10, at 816–19; Disruptive Technologies Push Bioterrorism to 
a Whole New Level, supra note 10. 
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 In Part II we discuss several of the most significant government 
initiatives undertaken after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 
(9/11) and their strengths and shortcomings. Lest we repeat the 
mistakes of the past, Part II explains why many of the federal policies to 
accelerate the commercial development of countermeasures, especially 
endeavors to incentivize the biopharmaceutical industry to invest in 
such developments, had limited success.28 
 In Part III we propose the creation of the Defense of Health 
Countermeasures Initiative, a multi-prong proposal to create a 
defensive triad comprising government, private industry, and academia 
to develop countermeasures for health threats posed by CBRN attacks. 
Key elements include the use of the government’s Other Transaction 
Authority to simplify procurement arrangements, the establishment of 
public-private partnerships with trusted intermediaries, and the creation 
of a network of incubators sited in ecosystems of excellence. 
 Part IV discusses potential challenges to collaboration and our 
responses thereto. We conclude with a summary of our proposal and a 
brief discussion of areas for further research.  
I.     GOVERNMENT AS MARKET ACTOR 
 Noble Laureate Robert M. Solow identified technological 
innovation as a fundamental source for productivity and the only 
reliable engine that drives change and sustained economic growth.29 
Paul Romer, who shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences with William D. Nordhaus in 2018, helped confirm that 
innovation promotes growth, but Romer went on to theorize that the 
pace at which the market generates new ideas and “the way in which 
they are translated into growth depend on other factors—such as state 
 
 28 See Capaccio & Wasson, supra note 26; see also Tara O’Toole & Thomas V. Inglesby, 
Editorial, Toward Biosecurity, 1 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, 
PRACTICE, & SCI. 1 (2003); Lynne Gilfillan et al., Taking the Measure of Countermeasures: 
Leaders’ Views on the Nation’s Capacity to Develop Biodefense Countermeasures, 2 BIOSECURITY 
& BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 320 (2004); Laura DeFrancesco, 
Throwing Money at Biodefense, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 375 (2004). 
 29 Robert M. Solow, Nobel Prize Laureate, Prize Lecture: Growth Theory and After (Dec. 8, 
1987), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economics/1987/solow/lecture [https://perma.cc/
NG5R-PNDB]. 
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support for research and development or intellectual-property 
protections.”30 
 Throughout U.S. history, governments have played the role of 
catalyst, venture capitalist, beta tester, and early adopter to promote 
technological research, development, and commercialization.31 As 
demonstrated by the Manhattan Project during World War II, and 
projects sponsored by the DARPA and the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
In-Q-Tel program (both discussed below), the U.S. government is 
capable of taking bold steps to foster the development of radically 
innovative technology to protect the American people from artificial 
and natural national threats. Further, legislation and regulations, such as 
transferable vouchers for fast-track FDA review (discussed in Section 
IV.A), the 21st Century Cures Act32 (discussed in Section I.C), and the 
Global Combating Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical 
Accelerator initiative (CARB-X) (discussed in detail in Section II.C33), 
can spur commercial efforts to innovate. 
A.     The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
 DARPA is a prime example of a successful governmental 
intervention in the market.34 Created during the 1960s following the 
Soviet Union’s successful and unexpected launch of the first satellite 
Sputnik,35 DARPA provided funding to members from the scientific 
community, public sector, university-based researchers, industry 
 
 30 The Nobel Prize for Economics Is Awarded for Work on the Climate and Economic 
Growth, ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/
10/08/the-nobel-prize-for-economics-is-awarded-for-work-on-the-climate-and-economic-
growth.  
 31 LERNER, supra note 24, at 6. 
 32 Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 33 See infra text accompanying notes 209–13. 
 34 Richard N. Kuyath, The Untapped Potential of the Department of Defense’s “Other 
Transaction” Authority, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 521, 526–28 (1995); see Fred Block, Swimming 
Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States, 36 POL. & 
SOC’Y 169, 175 (2008) (“ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) was initially 
established in 1962 and played a central role in the advance of computer technology . . . IPTO 
provided the resources to create computer science departments at major universities and 
funded a series of research project[s] that successfully pushed forward advances in human-
computer interface.”). 
 35 See Block, supra note 34, at 175. 
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syndicates, and private corporations (including start-ups).36 The agency 
facilitated cooperation and information exchange among visionary and 
creative technologists from diverse development and research sites, 
including helping private firms commercialize new discoveries.37 
DARPA provided venture capital-like services, including mentoring, 
strategic planning, and technological and business brokering services. 
Although the technologists were given wide discretion, DARPA helped 
determine the course of research and served as a catalyst for 
innovation.38 According to Erica Fuchs, 
[T]he little-studied key to DARPA’s success lies with its program 
managers. Each program manager, who is temporarily on leave from 
a permanent position in the academic or industrial research 
community, is given tremendous autonomy to identify and fund 
relevant technologies in his or her own field that are relevant to 
specific military purposes. To carry out their roles, program 
managers must execute four interrelated tasks: learn about current or 
forthcoming military challenges; identify emerging technologies that 
have the potential to address those challenges; grow the community 
of researchers working on these emerging technologies; and be sure, 
as this community evolves, to transfer responsibility for the further 
development and eventual commercialization of these technologies 
either to the military services or the commercial sector.39 
To minimize abuse or waste, DARPA staff transferred resources from 
unproductive groups to more promising, productive, and profitable 
ones.40 
 
 36 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 283 (“ARPA operated small offices staffed with top 
engineers and scientists, who were given extensive budget autonomy to sponsor promising 
ideas.”); Block, supra note 34 at 175. 
 37 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 273, 277, 283–84. 
 38 Id. at 283–84; see also Block, supra note 34, at 173–75. 
 39 Erica R. H. Fuchs, The Road to a New Energy System: Cloning DARPA Successfully, 26 
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 65, 67 (2009). 
 40 Block, supra note 34, at 175 (stating that ARPA employed visionary and creative 
technologists and gave them the autonomy to grant research funds). Failing contractors or 
projects are promptly cut from a DARPA program: “No projects or performers are so 
sacrosanct that poor performance is tolerated. The flip side of this willingness to stop failing 
efforts is that resources continuously become available to support new and emerging 
opportunities.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES ET AL., Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Relationships, in GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY/ACADEMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
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 Through DARPA and other initiatives, the federal government not 
only established many of the processes that formed the U.S. national 
innovation system, but also played an active role as a “market-maker.”41 
It took a risk-bearing role to create the infrastructure for the high 
technology world of today.42 Commercial fruits of government 
participation include not only computers and the internet, but jet 
planes, rockets, radar, lasers, civilian nuclear energy, GPS, and 
biotechnology (or biotech) as well.  
 More recently, DARPA’s driverless car Grand Challenge, initiated 
in 2004, caused the United States to go “from a car that traveled 7.5 
miles in a desert to a car driving itself down the George Washington 
Parkway in live traffic in 11 years.”43 This was accomplished “at a 
fraction of the cost and with a far broader set of contributors than a 
wholly government-driven effort could have supported.”44 DARPA 
“rewarded a few teams to keep them going but also attracted other 
teams who used their own resources. It iterated and accepted failures 
along the way. By providing focus and proofs of concept, it was able to 
build the critical mass to attract large commercial R&D investments.”45 
 
FOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: A WORKSHOP REPORT (2005), https://www.nap.edu/read/
11206/chapter/4 [https://perma.cc/J2B4-7DPS] [hereinafter NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES].  
 41 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 271; see also Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, 
“Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 53, 54–57 (2014). Nelson found that the national security concerns of the nations had been 
central in shaping their innovation systems. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 508; see also PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 257 (1985). 
 42 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 277; see also Hockett & Omarova, supra note 41, at 56–
57; Marc Berejka, A Case for Government Promoted Multi-Stakeholderism, 10 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 1, 1–2 (2012). For examples of federal legislation promoting innovation, see 
statutes cited supra note 23.  
 43 Alan Pentz, Agencies Can Seed Future Success with Creative Investment, GOV’T 
EXECUTIVE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.govexec.com/excellence/nextgen-strategist/2016/02/
agencies-can-seed-future-success-creative-investment/125747 [https://perma.cc/N663-H3FZ]. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.; see NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, supra note 40; see also Block, supra note 34, at 
174–75 (stating that following World War II, the Pentagon worked intimately and cooperated 
with other national security agencies, including the Atomic Energy Commission and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), and that such cooperation and funding had a 
key role in developing these technologies). On the invention of the internet, the personal 
computer, the laser, and Microsoft Windows, see Erica R.H. Fuchs, Rethinking the Role of the 
State in Technology Development: DARPA and the Case for Embedded Network Governance, 39 
RES. POL’Y 1133 (2010). See also John Sedgwick, The Men from DARPA, PLAYBOY, Aug. 1, 1991, 
at 108, 122, 154–56. 
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 As discussed further below, DARPA used its “Other Transaction 
Authority” to remove some of the administrative barriers that 
previously deterred many commercial companies from participating in 
the government marketplace.46 The DARPA model thus spurred 
innovation and competition by providing incentives to commercial 
companies “that lack the capabilities or desire to perform government-
funded research under standard procurement contracts, grants, or 
cooperative agreements.”47 Thus, the U.S. government has a proven 
track record as a powerful market actor.48 
B.     In-Q-Tel 
 Another successful example of the government as a driver of 
market competition is the first government-funded venture capital firm, 
In-Q-Tel.49 Launched in 1999 by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
 
 46  NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, supra note 42, at 23 (“[T]he majority of DARPA’s large 
prototype system work was done using the OTA mechanism.”). 
 47 Kuyath, supra note 34, at 524; see also Richard L. Dunn, Other Transaction Contracts: 
Poorly Understood, Little Used, NAT’L DEFENSE (May 15, 2017), http://www.national
defensemagazine.org/articles/2017/5/15/other-transactions-contracts-poorly-understood-little-
used [https://perma.cc/E5X9-FK93]. 
 48 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 41, at 55–57; LERNER, supra note 24, at 179. 
 49 During the time of In-Q-Tel’s establishment, the idea of a government-funded venture 
capital firm was entirely novel. See Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel: The CIA’s Tax-Funded Player in 
Silicon Valley, NPR (July 16, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/
2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-tel-the-cias-tax-funded-player-in-silicon-valley (“Whether you 
have realized it or not, over the past 13 years In-Q-Tel has changed your life. ‘Much of the 
touch-screen technology used now in iPads and other things came out of various companies 
that In-Q-Tel identified,’ [former general counsel of the CIA Jeffrey] Smith says.”); Alon-Beck, 
supra note 23, at 29; see also LERNER, supra note 24, at 176–77 (“For many of the start-ups, 
which had targeted corporate customers, the challenges of breaking into government 
procurements were daunting.”); John T. Reinert, In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence Agency as 
Venture Capitalist, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 677, 679–80, 679 n.7 (2013) (citing Deals & Deal 
Makers—Memo to Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2003, at 
C5) (noting that the Army, NASA, the U.S. Postal Service, and other government agencies were 
interested in investing in technology ventures); Marc Kaufman, NASA Invests in Its Future with 
Venture Capital Firm ‘Red Planet’ Nonprofit to Fund Aerospace Innovation, WASH. POST, Oct. 
31, 2006, at A19; Press Release, NASA, NASA Forms Partnership with Red Planet Capital, Inc. 
(Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/sep/HQ_06317_red_capital.html 
[https://perma.cc/2CJY-T4PM]; Joe Davidson, Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas to End 
Run of Bad News, WASH. POST (June 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/06/22/AR2010062205248.html [https://perma.cc/Q5L6-Q8CE]. 
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(CIA), In-Q-Tel’s charge was to “swim in [Silicon] Valley”50 and invest 
in emerging technology firms (making small stake investments by 
utilizing venture-like processes).51 In-Q-Tel allowed the CIA to invest in 
high technology firms that had not done business with the government 
before, serving as a bridge between the government (as a customer for 
innovative products and services) and emerging growth technology 
firms.52 
 In-Q-Tel was successful for many reasons, including its geographic 
proximity53 to Silicon Valley and its ability to simplify the process of 
 
 50 Then-CIA Director George Tenet said In-Q-Tel was created for this reason. Tim Cooke, 
Innovation By and For the Government, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Oct. 2, 2017), http://
www.govexec.com/excellence/promising-practices/2017/10/innovation-and-government/
141433 [https://perma.cc/77SE-E9JK]; see also Reinert, supra note 49, at 693–94. 
 51 See LERNER, supra note 24, at 176 (by presenting new firms and technologies as 
candidates for acquisition by the CIA, In-Q-Tel served as a bridge linking private and public 
entities and enhanced the government’s role as a new customer for products developed by 
emerging growth firms); see also BUS. EXECS. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN-Q-TEL VENTURE 15–16 
(2001) [hereinafter BENS REPORT] (comparing the In-Q-Tel model with the traditional VC 
model). 
 52 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 29 n.177. 
 53 Id. at 37. Geographic proximity is a very important contributor. Personal similarity also 
matters. See Ola Bengtsson & David H. Hsu, How Do Venture Capital Partners Match with 
Startup Founders? (Mar. 2010) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
1568131. According to Bengtsson and Hsu,  
[P]ersonal similarity matters in the [venture capitalist (VC)] matching market. We 
find that a match between a founder and a VC partner is twice as likely when both 
share the same ethnic background. A match is also more likely if both attended a top 
ranked university. As further evidence of the importance of similarity, we show that 
when the founder and VC partner share an ethnic tie or have both attended a top 
ranked university the VC’s investment represents a larger fraction of its aggregate 
investments in all portfolio companies. These linkages are significant only for early 
stage investments in industries with higher levels of intangible assets, for which 
information costs are likely to be more pronounced. These linkages are also more 
important when the distance between VC and company is greater. These subsample 
findings suggest that the economic role of similarity is reduce[d] information costs. 
We infer that lower information costs associated with similar personal characteristics 
allow VCs to make larger investments. 
Id. at 4; see also Lars Ola Bengtsson, Repeated Relationships Between Venture Capitalists and 
Entrepreneurs 3–5 (2006) (unpublished MBA thesis, University of Chicago) (on file with 
University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business) (after examining data on roughly 1,500 
serial entrepreneurs, Bengtsson found that a failed entrepreneur is twice as likely to repeat VC 
relationships (as evaluated against a successful entrepreneur)). 
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federal procurement. The CIA used its Other Transaction Authority 
(OTA), a flexible contracting vehicle that lowers transaction costs by 
reducing the disincentives non-traditional government bidders 
experience when trying to contract with the federal government.54 We 
discuss OTA further in Section III.C.  
 “Unlike a true venture capital model, In-Q-Tel is more aptly 
described as a ‘technology accelerator,’ seeking speed and agility in 
discovering innovative IT solutions for the Agency.”55 Its value 
proposition centered on obtaining IT solutions, not foremost on return 
on equity or assets. Deals always resulted in a product or service (e.g., 
feasibility assessment, test product, or prototype). As with venture 
capital (VC) funding, the CIA’s investments were “smart money,” which 
provided the portfolio companies with not only cash but also 
“intellectual capital [and] technology-related experience.”56 The CIA 
also offered “the Agency as a potential test-bed.”57 Consistent with its 
results-oriented approach, the CIA conducted extensive due diligence 
before forming a contract comprising an “[i]n-depth investigation into 
the [potential portfolio] company’s structure and financial status as well 
as the ability of the proposed technology to meet the Agency problem 
domain.”58 
 To encourage recruitment of established managers and staff from 
the venture capital industry, and to prevent them from leaving In-Q-Tel 
for more lucrative private positions, the CIA offered a rewarding 
compensation scheme, which was very unusual compared with typical 
government jobs.59 “The [compensation] included a flat salary, a bonus 
paid based on how well In-Q-Tel met government needs, and an 
employee investment program, which took a prespecified portion of 
each employee’s salary and invested alongside . . . [the] portfolio.”60 
 
 54 See Kuyath, supra note 34, at 524. According to Kuyath, OTA arrangements are in line 
with the purpose of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 
Stat. 3243 (codified in scattered sections of 10 and 41 U.S.C.). Kuyath, supra note 34, at 524. 
 55 BENS REPORT, supra note 51, at ix; see About IQT, IN-Q-TEL, https://www.iqt.org/about-
iqt [https://perma.cc/67DB-DB4D] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 56 BENS REPORT, supra note 51, at ix. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See LERNER, supra note 24, at 176. 
 60 Id. at 177. For example, in 2012, its CEO Christopher Darby earned roughly $1 million. 
See Henn, supra note 49.  
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C.     21st Century Cures Act: Big Data and Artificial Intelligence 
 Acknowledging the urgent need for using big data and artificial 
intelligence to develop new therapies, President Obama signed the 21st 
Century Cures Act into law on December 13, 2016.61 The Act 
established “Information Commons” initiatives to facilitate broad, open, 
and responsible sharing of data.62 Signaling the value of large data sets 
comprising information garnered from electronic health records 
(EHRs), pharmaceutical giant Roche agreed in February 2018 to pay 
$1.9 billion to acquire Flatiron Health, a privately held New York-based 
healthcare technology company.63 Flatiron Health collects clinical data 
on cancer patients and has previously teamed up64 with public parties, 
including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)65 and the National 
 
 61 See Mary A. Majumder et al., Sharing Data Under the 21st Century Cures Act, 19 
GENETICS MED. 1289 (2017). 
 62 See id. at 1289 (“At the same time, the Act exacerbates or neglects several challenges, for 
example, increasing complexity by adding a new definition of ‘identifiable’ and failing to 
address the financial sustainability of data sharing and the scope of commercialization. In sum, 
the Act is a positive step, yet there is still much work to be done before the goals of broad data 
sharing and utilization can be achieved.”). 
 63 See Lydia Ramsey, Pharma Giant Roche is Buying Cancer Tech Startup Flatiron Health for 
$1.9 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2018, 3:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/roche-
acquires-flatiron-health-for-19-billion-2018-2?r=UK&IR=T [https://perma.cc/4GD8-UM3F]. 
“Flatiron has raised more than $300 million from investors across the technology and health 
care investors, including Roche, Allen & Company, GV, First Round Capital and SV Angel.” 
Christina Farr, Alphabet-Backed Flatiron Health Is Being Acquired by Roche, CNBC (Feb. 15, 
2018, 3:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/roche-buying-flatiron-health-backed-by-
alphabet.html [https://perma.cc/9A2G-6R2J]. 
 64 On Flatiron’s partnerships and milestones, see Nat Turner, Flatiron’s Next Phase, 
FLATIRON HEALTH (Feb. 15, 2018), https://flatiron.com/blog/roche [https://perma.cc/UP7U-
JCM2]. 
 65 See Nick Paul Taylor, FDA Teams with Flatiron for Real-World Cancer Data Analytics 
Project, FIERCEBIOTECH (May 27, 2016, 8:04 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/it/fda-teams-
flatiron-for-real-world-cancer-data-analytics-project [https://perma.cc/CZL4-J9KM]; see also 
Michael Mezher, Woodcock: Drug Safety Surveillance System Ready for Full Operation, REG. 
AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2016/2/
woodcock-drug-safety-surveillance-system-ready-for-full-operation [https://perma.cc/8UHZ-
5CXA] (“Launched in 2008, the Sentinel initiative encompasses FDA’s effort to meet 
obligations set by Congress in the 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
(FDAAA) to develop a system for active postmarket risk identification and analysis for medical 
products.”). 
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Cancer Institute, academic medical centers,66 and private parties such as 
independent community oncology practices,67 life sciences oncology 
companies, and others. 
D.     Need for Additional Government Intervention for CBRN 
Countermeasures 
 Notwithstanding existing public support for innovation and new 
therapies, the U.S. federal government is losing its place as a world 
leader in generating innovation, technology, and economic growth.68 To 
successfully compete in tomorrow’s marketplace, promote growth, and 
protect its citizens, as well as to increase productivity and expand 
economic and social value,69 U.S. policymakers must institute sweeping 
innovation policies to modernize the U.S. innovation infrastructure. 
 In the past, most of the U.S. research and development (R&D) 
spending, which contributes to innovation, came from the Department 
of Defense (DoD). For example, according to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), 40% of R&D spending in the United 
 
 66 See Nick Paul Taylor, Roche Pens $1.9B Deal to Buy Oncology Data Firm Flatiron, 
FIERCEBIOTECH (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/roche-pens-
1-9b-deal-to-buy-oncology-data-firm-flatiron [https://perma.cc/LTX4-R2B8]. 
 67 Flatiron Health  
expanded partnerships with some of the nation’s largest independent community 
oncology practices using the first EHR-embedded technology solution for the Center 
for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation’s (CMMI) Oncology Care Model (OCM). 
Approximately one-third of all OCM practices use Flatiron’s technology to adapt to 
the rapidly-changing requirements of value-based care programs for which practices 
commit to providing enhanced services to patients, such as care coordination, 
navigation and the use of national treatment guidelines.  
Press Release, Flatiron Health, Flatiron Health Expands Technology Partnerships with 
Oncology Care Model Practices (June 13, 2017), https://flatiron.com/press/press-release/
flatiron-health-expands-technology-partnerships-with-oncology-care-model-practices [https://
perma.cc/9NPR-F3WA]. 
 68 JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: HOW AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION EDGE, 
WHY IT MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET IT BACK 3 (2007) (“In tomorrow’s world, 
even more than today’s, innovation will be the engine of progress. So unless we move to rectify 
this dismal situation, the United States cannot hope to remain a leader. What’s at stake is 
nothing less than the future prosperity and security of our nation.”). 
 69 See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent 
Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, 
at 1, 5. 
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States came from the DoD in 1987. By 2013, the DoD provided less than 
20% of the U.S. R&D, whereas commercial R&D increased its spending 
by 200% between 1987 and 2013.70 Today, however, the military and 
commercial demands in the United States have diverged drastically,71 
resulting in declining civilian-military technology spillovers.72 For 
example, the U.S. military market no longer plays a strategic role in the 
computer and semiconductor industries (as compared with its position 
in the 1960s).73 
 Government is once again needed to drive the innovation 
necessary to even begin to seriously address today’s CBRN threats. The 
need is particularly acute given the closing of major private R&D 
institutions, such as Bell Labs and General Electric’s R&D enterprise. By 
investing in knowledge, human capital, and innovation, governments 
promote knowledge spillovers,74 and thereby encourage the formation 
(and survival) of new entrepreneurial firms and new lines of business in 
existing firms.75 
 The government is not a profit-maximizing entity,76 and is 
therefore in a better position than private investors to deal with 
 
 70 Cooke, supra note 50. 
 71 See Kenneth Flamm & Thomas L. McNaugher, Rationalizing Technology Investments, in 
RESTRUCTURING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 119 (John D. Steinbruner ed., 1989) (citing 
declines in the share of basic research in DoD research and development spending, as well as 
increases in the congressional demand for military research and development programs to yield 
near-term applications in weapons systems). 
 72 Id. An exception is the DoD funding of the Small Business Innovation Research program, 
on which it spends approximately $1 billion in grants annually. SMALL BUS. INNOVATION RES. 
& SMALL BUS. TECH. TRANSFER PROGRAM INTERAGENCY POLICY COMM., SBIR/STTR 
INTERAGENCY POLICY COMMITTEE REPORT TO CONGRESS: AWARD SIZE FLEXIBILITY 9 (2014), 
http://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/3_award_size-ipc_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZG3-
DZUW]. 
 73 See DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 44–45 (1998). 
 74 See DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 9–10 
(2003), http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/2977/attachments/1/translations/en/
renditions/pdf (discussing “knowledge spillover” and how “small firms account for a 
disproportional share of new product innovations given their low R&D expenditures”). 
 75 LERNER, supra note 24, at 10. 
 76 See DAVID A. LEWIS, ELSIE HARPER-ANDERSON & LAWRENCE A. MOLNAR, INCUBATING 
SUCCESS: INCUBATION BEST PRACTICES THAT LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL NEW VENTURES 8 (2011). 
This study found: 
Most high-achieving incubators are not-for-profit models. All but one of the top-
performing incubators in this study were nonprofits, as were 93% of the respondent 
population. This finding suggests that incubation programs focused on earning 
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situations of great uncertainty that require long-term investments in 
radical innovation.77 Government actors are often not as efficient as 
private firms,78 but they can alleviate market inefficiencies and failures 
by addressing the tragedy of the commons,79 monitoring economic 
progress and market trends, and guiding local systems and intra-
industrial innovation to meet social and military needs.80 By promoting 
long-term development strategies, governments can serve as “bridge 
builders” between the public sector and private businesses and 
innovative industries.81 Joint collaboration gives government scientists 
an opportunity to learn from industry and vice versa. Ideally, 
government participation complements, and does not replace, private 
efforts to build emerging growth firms. 
 Public-private partnerships use various methods of collaboration 
designed to combine the government’s forward-looking policies and 
funds with the private sector’s innovative efforts. Such efforts often 
include support from for-profit private intermediaries and nonprofit 
organizations, such as private disease foundations. There are several 
financing models of incubators, ranging from public non-profit to 
quasi-public to private non-profit.82 This Article centers on public-
private and quasi-public–private partnerships, given the need for the 
government to fund basic research and seed companies, in an industry 
 
profits are not strongly correlated to client success. Instead, the most important goals 
of top-performing incubation programs are creating jobs and fostering the 
entrepreneurial climate in the community, followed by diversifying the local 
economy, building or accelerating new industries and businesses, and attracting or 
retaining businesses to the host region. 
Id.  
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. at 9. 
 79 See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 41, at 57, 64–66 (explaining the “market-making” 
role of the government whereby the government assumes certain risks that private actors are 
unwilling or unable to assume in order to either “(a) make a publicly beneficial market possible, 
or (b) facilitate an incipient such market’s growth to critical mass”). 
 80 Id. at 67. 
 81 See KAO, supra note 68, at 198 (“They also would serve as bridge-builders between 
creative industries and the business mainstream, following models pioneered by such 
organizations as the Learning Lab in Denmark and Arts & Business in the United Kingdom. 
Above all, they would be mechanisms for linking federal, regional, and urban development 
strategies.”). 
 82 For example, ten large pharmaceutical companies formed TransCelerate BioPharma 
“based on a nonprofit precompetitive model, to speed drug development by broad participation 
and collaboration across the global R&D community.” Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xx. 
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in which the “average time between the ‘key enabling discovery’ and the 
introduction of a drug is 12–15 years.”83 
 But governments and industries cannot fill the countermeasure 
pipeline alone. Institutes of higher learning (and national systems of 
innovation84) play critical roles in today’s knowledge economy.85 The 
“standard” growth theory in economics tends to concentrate on the 
roles of the business firms (including the constraints and incentives that 
are provided by competition in a market setting), and it is often blind to 
a wide range of other institutions that have played key roles in 
stimulating growth and driving innovation.86 In the case of drug 
discovery, “[p]ublicly funded research, occurring at universities and the 
National Institutes of Health, over the years has produced a great 
majority of the key enabling discoveries underlying nearly 80% of the 
important drugs.”87 Typically, “the academic laboratory . . . identifies the 
interesting molecular targets that are important enzymes and proteins 
in various biochemical and physiological processes.”88 The U.S. 
government funded and made publicly available the sequencing of the 
human genome, but it took academic researchers to convert the basic 
science into innovative discoveries, including “the biomarkers of disease 
identified in genomics, proteomics, and biochemical studies” and the 
“identification of new messenger molecules and their receptors.”89 For 
example, the University of California and Stanford University were 
instrumental in developing the gene sequencing techniques, which 
biotech companies like Genentech commercialized.90 
 
 83 Id. at xix; see also Filippo Belloc, Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering 
the Conventional Wisdom, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 821, 823–25 (2014). 
 84 In this context, the term “systems” means a “set of institutional actors that, together, 
play[] the major role in influencing innovation performance.” NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 4. 
 85 Id. at 4–5. See also Philippe Larédo & Philippe Mustar, Public Sector Research: A Growing 
Role in Innovation Systems, 42 MINERVA 11 (2004). 
 86 Larédo & Mustar, supra note 85, at 11–12. 
 87 Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xix–xx. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Ferid Murad, Foreword, in Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xvi. 
 90 See Mark Edwards, Fiona Murray & Robert Yu, Value Creation and Sharing Among 
Universities, Biotechnology and Pharma, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 618 (2003), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=904260. As Edwards et al. explain: 
Scientific institutions have always made a contribution to medical progress, but their 
traditional role was to educate and to publish advances in basic science—creating the 
intellectual foundation upon which others have built more commercial discoveries. 
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 To develop new treatments, vaccines, and protective devices, 
government agencies need to collaborate with academia and private 
industry to identify the specific challenges not being adequately 
addressed by the private or governmental sectors. The government must 
then be willing to help fund the cutting-edge public and private 
research, innovation, development, and commercialization91 necessary 
to show proof of concept and feasibility.92 Accordingly, the Defense of 
 
In recent times, however, universities have become active participants in the 
commercialization of scientific ideas through patenting and the establishment of 
active technology licensing as a legitimate and increasingly important part of 
academic life.  
This is especially true with respect to university and medical center patenting in 
biotechnology. For example, before 1989 the top recipient of biotechnology patents 
was Merck (Whitehouse Station, NJ, USA); however, a decade later, in 1999, the 
combined campuses of the University of California held that spot. In fact, twelve 
academic institutions were among the top 40 biotechnology patent-generating 
entities over this past decade, including Stanford University (Palo Alto, CA, USA), 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT; Cambridge, MA, USA), the 
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH; Boston, MA) and The Scripps Research 
Institute (La Jolla, CA, USA). 
Id. at 618. 
 91 As Charles Wessner, Director of the Program on Technology, Innovation, and 
Entrepreneurship at the National Academy of Sciences, cautioned in 2008: 
There is great complacency in Washington about the US position in the world. There 
is relatively limited understanding in the policy community about the scale and scope 
of foreign investments in new technologies, including new institutions, such as 
ASTAR in Singapore or the large and apparently effective Chinese S&T Parks, or the 
highly successful Microelectronics center, called IMEC, in Flanders. . . . [Although] 
in the US we do not need to do exactly what others are doing . . . we do need to 
greatly strengthen the interaction between the government, the universities, and the 
private sector by providing a wide variety of incentives for cooperation on the new 
technologies that will be the basis of future industries. 
Quoted in Philipp Marxgut, Innovation Policy in the US—An Interview with Charles Wessner, 
OFF. SCI. & TECH. AUSTRIA: BRIDGES (Oct. 19, 2008), http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/
volume-19-october-16-2008/item/3585-innovation-policy-in-the-us-an-interview-with-charles-
wessner [https://perma.cc/Q87Q-7QDG]. 
 92 The United States is already in competition with China for preeminence in the field of 
artificial intelligence (AI). Like the space race between the United States and the former Soviet 
Union, the AI race is likely to have a major impact on the next generation of innovation. While 
China is actively funding start-ups, the United States has lagged in providing public funding, 
relying instead on private actors like Google. See, e.g., Jackie Snow, The Defense Department Is 
Taking on ISIS with Google’s Open-Source AI Software, MIT TECH. REV.: THE DOWNLOAD 
(Mar. 6, 2018, 2:31 PM), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/610429/the-
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Health Countermeasures Initiative we propose in Part III is designed to 
allow the government to make direct equity investments in seed projects 
through the DHCI Incubators and national platforms for networks of 
innovation hubs. At the same time, our proposed DHCI encourages 
private actors to help finance such projects and makes it possible for 
universities and academic scientists to share in the economic proceeds 
through the Bayh-Dole Act and the glory through the right to publish 
novel findings. This defensive triad, comprising government, academia, 
and industry, should promote effectiveness and, more importantly, 
reduce political capture (discussed further in Section IV.D) and other 
distortions. 
II.     EXISTING MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL, 
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS 
 Following the terror events of 9/11, including the anthrax attacks, 
the federal government and certain states took various measures to 
protect U.S. civilians from potential CBRN terrorism and other 
emergency outbreaks. These included financial incentives to mobilize 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to pursue the R&D of 
medical countermeasures, such as diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and 
other treatments, that can minimize the impact of a CBRN attack.93 
 Despite these efforts, the current pipeline of new countermeasures 
is not robust. Many start-up companies continue to find themselves 
trapped in the “Valley of Death,” populated by firms at the early stage of 
development that are caught, as in amber, in the “time between a basic 
science discovery (usually in academic labs) and the decision to commit 




 93 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44786, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN THE 115TH 
CONGRESS 28 (2018) (“Policymakers identified a lack of such countermeasures as a challenge to 
responding to the CBRN threat. To address this gap, the federal government created several 
programs to encourage private sector development of new CBRN medical countermeasures.”). 
 94 Moving Drug Discoveries Beyond ‘The Valley of Death’, ABBVIE (Feb. 15, 2016), https://
stories.abbvie.com/stories/moving-drug-discoveries-beyond-the-valley-of-death.htm [https://
perma.cc/Y8DB-9GUZ]. The so-called “‘valley of death’ . . . separates ‘upstream research on 
promising genes, proteins, and biological pathways’ by government-funded academic 
researchers from ‘downstream drug candidates’ outside firms fund in hopes of commercializing 
the researchers’ discoveries.” CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE 
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A.     The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 
 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (PHSBPRA) specifically authorizes the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to “prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies”95 by coordinating the 
activities of federal, state, and local governments. In accordance with 
this mandate, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
launched three programs in 2003: (1) the BioSense program, “a 
nationwide integrated public health surveillance system for early 
detection and assessment of potential bioterrorism-related illness”;96 (2) 
 
ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO LAW AND STRATEGY 155 (5th ed. 2018) (quoting Arti K. Rai et al., 
Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug 
Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008)); see LEWIS M. BRANSCOMB & 
PHILLIP E. AUERSWALD, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH, NIST GCR 02-841, BETWEEN 
INVENTION AND INNOVATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FUNDING FOR EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT 1–2, 4–5 (2002), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/
gcr02-841.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF7G-492R]; GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., AN ECONOMIC 
INVESTIGATION OF THE VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE 2–3 (2007), http://
www.osec.doc.gov/Report-Valley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9TUV-CMBM]; see also PHILIP E. AUERSWALD ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH, 
NIST GCR 02-841A, UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: A “BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION PROJECT” REPORT 
(2005), http://www.nist.gov/tpo/sbir/upload/gcr02-841a.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3P6-6M8B]; 
Ederyn Williams, Crossing the Valley of Death, INGENIA, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 23, http://
www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/ventures/valley.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ABB-MH3Q] (discussing 
valley of death in the United Kingdom); Philipp Marxgut, supra note 91. 
 95 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594. 
 96 Deborah W. Gould et al., The Evolution of BioSense: Lessons Learned and Future 
Directions, 132 PUB. HEALTH REP. 7S–11S (2017). 
The initial BioSense program had 4 goals: (1) improve the nation’s capabilities for 
conducting near–real-time biosurveillance and health situational awareness; (2) 
advance analytics for prediagnostic and diagnostic data; (3) increase sharing of 
approaches and technology among federal, state, and local public health agencies; 
and (4) promote national system standards and specifications to ensure integration 
with other public health systems. 
Id.; see also Colleen A. Bradley et al., BioSense: Implementation of a National Early Event 
Detection and Situational Awareness System, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. S11 
(2005); Jerome I. Tokars et al., Summary of Data Reported to CDC’s National Automated 
Biosurveillance System, 2008, 10 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 1, 11–12 
(2010); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. 
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the BioShield program, which is charged with accelerating “the research, 
development, acquisition, and availability of medical countermeasures 
to improve the government’s preparedness for and ability to counter 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat agents;97 and (3) 
 
L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594; John W. Loonsk, BioSense—A National Initiative for Early 
Detection and Quantification of Public Health Emergencies, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 53 (2004).  
A major component of the BioSense system was the infrastructure that CDC 
developed to receive and securely manage health care-sourced data and to host the 
BioSense application for analyzing and visualizing data reported to BioSense. The 
infrastructure included (1) data management processes to receive and process 
inbound clinical care and related data, (2) analytic processes to bin records into 
syndrome categories and analyze trends for suspect signals, and (3) a user interface 
that allowed CDC and state and local staff members to access patient-level data to 
investigate results, report on notifications, and coordinate responses. Data from 
different sources were added to the BioSense system over time, including data from 
US Department of Veterans Affairs and US Department of Defense hospitals and 
ambulatory care clinics (2003), test orders from the Laboratory Corporation of 
America (2004), data from nonfederal hospitals directly reporting to CDC (2005), 
data from state health departments’ syndromic surveillance systems (2006), anti-
infective prescription data from Relay Health outpatient pharmacies (2007), and test 
orders from Quest Diagnostics (2007). By 2008, the primary data sources for 
BioSense included 333 Department of Defense and 770 Veterans Affairs hospitals 
and ambulatory clinics and 532 civilian hospital emergency departments (EDs). 
Gould et al., supra, at 7S. 
 97 Philip K. Russell, Project BioShield: What It Is, Why It Is Needed, and Its 
Accomplishments So Far, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S68 (2007). 
The legislation authorizes use of the Special Reserve Fund, which makes available 
$5.6 billion over 10 years for the advanced development and purchase of medical 
countermeasures. This appropriation is intended to provide an economic incentive to 
the pharmaceutical industry to develop medical countermeasures for which the 
government is the only significant market. Acquisitions under Project BioShield are 
restricted to products in development that are potentially licensable within 8 years 
from the time of contract award. In exercising the procurement authorities under 
Project BioShield, HHS has launched acquisition programs to address each of the 4 
threat agents, including Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), smallpox virus, botulinum 
toxins, and radiological/nuclear agents, originally deemed by the Department of 
Homeland Security to be threats to the US population sufficient to affect national 
security. At the time of writing [2007], 7 contracts have been awarded: (1) 
recombinant protective antigen anthrax vaccine, the next-generation anthrax vaccine 
(contract terminated in December 2006 for default); (2) anthrax vaccine adsorbed, 
the currently licensed anthrax vaccine; (3) anthrax therapeutics (monoclonal); (4) 
anthrax therapeutics (human immune globulin); (5) the pediatric formulation of 
potassium iodide; (6) Ca- and Zn-diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (DTPA), chelating 
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BioWatch, a program “designed to sample the air in major metropolitan 
areas for pathogens that terrorists might use.”98 
B.     BioShield 
 Of the three programs authorized by the PHSBPRA, this Article 
will focus on the BioShield initiative. This federal program is designed 
to address the CBRN threat gap by encouraging private sector 
development of new CBRN medical countermeasures. Project BioShield 
established a direct procurement mechanism whereby the federal 
government can buy a countermeasure up to eight years before the 
product is likely to be fully developed.99 Although Project BioShield was 
designed to remove barriers to procurement and to address the market 
uncertainty faced by countermeasure developers, initial implementation 
of Project BioShield 1 was not very successful.100 
 The disappointing results of BioShield 1 were due in part to the 
lack of adequate monetary incentives101 to motivate private 
pharmaceutical companies to invest the hundreds of millions of dollars 
in R&D necessary to successfully produce a new medical 
countermeasure.102 The following are the five broad stages in the 
 
agents to treat ingestion of certain radiological particles; and (7) botulinum 
antitoxins. Additional acquisition contracts [were] expected to be awarded in 2007. 
Id.  
 98 Gould et al., supra note 96, at 7S. 
 99 Russell, supra note 97, at S68. 
 100 See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN THE 115TH CONGRESS, supra note 93, at 28 
(“Despite these efforts, the federal government still lacks medical countermeasures for many 
CBRN threats, including Ebola.”). Since the publication of Peter K. Russell’s Article in 2007, 
Russell, supra note 97, BARDA and Merck & Co. have developed an Ebola vaccine that BARDA 
is seeking to license and perhaps add to the Strategic National Stockpile. Steve Brozak, An 




 101 FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43607, THE PROJECT BIOSHIELD ACT: ISSUES 
FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 1 n.1 (2014) (“Representatives of the pharmaceutical industry 
attributed the paucity of CBRN agent countermeasures to the lack of a significant commercial 
market.”) (citing Alan Pemberton, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., Testimony before the U.S. 
H. Select Comm. on Homeland Security (May 15, 2003)). 
 102  See id. Joseph Larsen, former Deputy Director of BARDA, stressed the importance of 
incentives, stating that both push and pull government incentives are often required to get 
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innovation process, as well as the financial sources that are usually 
available at each stage.103 First is the stage of basic research, for which 
funding is usually available to entrepreneurs from government sources, 
such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) phase I 
(Feasibility and Proof of Concept),104 and from private corporate 
resources, such as the funds large corporations allocate to R&D. Second 
is the proof of concept or invention stage, for which financing sources 
usually include private angel investors, corporate R&D funds, and 
government funding from SBIR phase II (Research/Research and 
Development)105 and technology labs. Third is the early-stage 
technology development stage, which is often termed the Valley of 
 
major pharmaceutical companies to participate. Telephone interview with Joseph Larsen, 
Senior Vice President of Life Scis., Strategic Mktg. Innovations, Inc. (June 4, 2018). When the 
U.S. government set up the dedicated fund to finance the development for anthrax cures and 
vaccines as part of BioShield (a “pull” initiative), only small, inexperienced biotech companies 
applied to participate. Id. 
 103 Except as noted otherwise, the balance of this paragraph is drawn from Alon-Beck, supra 
note 23, at 296. 
 104 The SBIR program was founded in 1982. It was intended to encourage small businesses 
to develop new products and processes as well as present valuable research for the nation’s 
research and development efforts. The program requires the eleven federal agencies with 
extramural research budgets in excess of $100 million to allocate a certain percentage of their 
total extramural research and development budgets for grants or contracts to small businesses 
conducting research and development that have commercialization potential and meet the 
needs of the U.S. government. See CHARLES W. WESSNER, SBIR AND THE PHASE III CHALLENGE 
OF COMMERCIALIZATION: REPORT OF A SYMPOSIUM 3–5, 9 (2007). According to Wessner:  
Commercializing SBIR-funded technologies though federal procurement is no less 
challenging for innovative small companies. Finding private sources of funding to 
further develop even successful SBIR Phase II projects—those innovations that have 
demonstrated technical and commercial feasibility—is often difficult because the 
eventual “market” for products is unlikely to be large enough to attract private 
venture funding. As Mark Redding of Impact Technologies noted at the conference, 
venture capitalists tend to avoid funding firms focused on government contracts 
citing higher costs, regulatory burdens, and limited markets associated with 
government contracting. 
Id. at 9; see also About SBIR, SBIR, http://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir [https://perma.cc/
WS3J-CDEX] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (listing the program’s objectives as: “Stimulate 
technological innovation. Meet Federal research and development needs. Foster and encourage 
participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by women and socially or economically 
disadvantaged persons. Increase private-sector commercialization of innovations derived from 
Federal research and development funding.”). 
 105 See About SBIR, supra note 104. 
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Death because of the entrepreneur’s difficulty in obtaining financing for 
this stage.106 Fourth is product development, the stage at which private 
venture capital firms traditionally invest in start-up firms. Fifth, and 
last, is the production or marketing stage, for which financing sources 
include private venture capitalists, corporate venture capital, private 
equity, or commercial debt.  
 PHSBPRA provided inadequate R&D funding to get private actors 
across the Valley of Death.107 Even if a private firm was successful 
developing a new treatment, there tended to be no continuous 
commercial market for the product. “There is little incentive for 
publicly-traded drug companies to make products with low profit 
margins, infrequent use and a high likelihood of liability lawsuits, such 
as vaccines.”108 
 Second, the government was unwilling to guarantee that the 
pharmaceutical companies’ patent and other intellectual property rights 
would not be compromised if a public crisis required large scale 
dissemination of their drugs.109 After the anthrax attacks in 2001, the 
 
 106 See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 375; see also Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 270–71. 
 107 See Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 295–96. 
 108 See Janet Temko, The Project BioShield Act of 2004: An Innovative Failure 10 (May 
2006) (unpublished third-year student paper, Harvard University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:8944670 (citing Scott Hensley & Bernard Wysocki Jr., Missing Medicine—
Shots in the Dark: As Industry Profits Elsewhere, U.S. Lacks Vaccines, Antibiotics; Incentives Are 
Low to Develop Some Public-Health Drugs; New Moves in Washington; A $200 Million Legal 
Fight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at A.1). As Temko pointed out, “drugs that treat a disease are 
more lucrative than vaccines to prevent it partly because people are more inclined to pay for a 
medicine that treats a condition they already have.” Id. See also id. at 9 n.44 (“when you’re 
dealing with a product for which there is no guarantee of a return, or for which the market is 
tenuous, these companies clearly need some assurances that there will ultimately be a return for 
their investment. Without such assurances, they will simply pursue the development of other 
products.”) (quoting Project BioShield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American 
Public: Hearings Before the Comm. On Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 16, 10 n.44 (2003) (statement 
of Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases)). 
 109 See Temko, supra note 108, at 9. Regarding the authority of ARPA to use OTA, Kuyath 
explained: 
In support of its position on the Bayh-Dole Act, ARPA relied on the legislative 
history of two defense authorization acts. First, the conference report of the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees on the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1992 stated:  
The conferees also recognize that the regulations applicable to the allocation of  
patent and data rights under the procurement statutes may not be appropriate  
to partnership arrangements in certain cases. The conferees believe that the option 
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government forced Bayer to lower the already discounted price of the 
Cipro drug by threatening “to force compulsory licensing of the patent 
on Cipro in order to enable generic companies to enter the market.”110 
The PHSBPRA failed to address this issue. 
 Third, the PHSBPRA lacked adequate indemnification provisions 
that would shield pharmaceutical companies from liability for new 
 
to support partnerships pursuant to section 2371 of title 10, United States Code,  
provides adequate flexibility for the Defense Department and other partnership 
participants to agree to allocations of intellectual property rights in a manner 
that will meet the needs of all parties involved in a transaction.  
Additionally, the House Armed Services Committee report on the 1995 National 
Defense Authorization bill noted: 
. . . TRP policy provides that the Federal Government should avoid acquiring 
rights if that will impede commercialization. Foreign access to technology is 
scrutinized and, if deemed necessary, restricted. Broad exposure of the 
technology among partnerships participants is encouraged. The Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) can fully effectuate these policies because it 
has great flexibility to tailor patent and other intellectual property rights 
provisions under its “other transactions” authority.  
. . . The Bayh-Dole Act sets forth the Government’s policy regarding allocation of 
patent rights to inventions conceived or first actually reduced to practice under 
contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with small business firms and 
educational and other nonprofit organizations (subject inventions). This patent 
policy also has been extended to large businesses. The contractor (or recipient, in the 
case of grants and cooperative agreements) is permitted to retain title to subject 
inventions and the Government receives a nonexclusive, nontransferable, 
irrevocable, worldwide, paid-up license to practice or have practiced subject 
inventions on behalf of the United States throughout the world. 
Kuyath, supra note 34, at 531–32, 536–37. 
 110 See Temko, supra note 108, at 10 n.43 (citing Gregory M. Lamb, New Buffer for 
Bioterror’s Tempest, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 1, 2004), https://www.csmonitor.com/
2004/0701/p14s02-stct.html (“After the anthrax letters scare, Tommy Thompson, the HHS 
secretary, demanded that Bayer lower its prices on Cipro, an anthrax drug, or risk losing its 
patent—sending a chilling signal to drugmakers.”); Roundtable Discussion: When Terror 
Strikes—Preparing an Effective and Immediate Public Health Response: Hearing of the Comm. 
On Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th Cong. 47–48 (2005) (response to questions of the 
committee by Chuck Ludlam) (They say, “Look what happened to Bayer,” which was subject to 
virtual expropriation of its antibiotic, Cipro, by HHS following the 2001 anthrax attack. In fact, 
the outrageous actions of HHS in that case have plagued our ability to engage this industry in 
this research. We must have credible Administration officials state categorically that these 
Mafioso tactics will never ever be seen again against a company that develops countermeasures 
for infectious pathogens. The companies must be rewarded, not vilified.)). See also Cynthia M. 
Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and Immunity in the Development of 
Biodefense Vaccines, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 111, 113 (2005).  
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drugs and vaccines. Wyeth spent millions defending lawsuits related to 
its smallpox vaccines.111 The fact that vaccines require animal testing 
and cannot be ethically tested on humans make such concerns 
particularly acute.112 Fourth, the PHSBPRA did not reduce the lengthy 
FDA approval process (which can take ten to fifteen years).113 Fifth, the 
failure of the procurement contract, whereby the small biotechnology 
firm VaxGen agreed to provide millions of doses of an unproven 
anthrax vaccine, deterred other small (and large) private companies 
from collaborating with the government.114 
 
 111 See Temko, supra note 108, at 10–11 (“Wyeth started making smallpox vaccine in 1885 
and was a principle [sic] supplier of childhood vaccines in the United States for most of the 
20th Century. But beginning in the 1980s, it became the target of lawsuits linking vaccines to a 
wide range of illnesses without obvious causes, such as epilepsy and attention deficit disorder. 
Wyeth estimates the industry has spent more than $200 million defending itself against 
hundreds of lawsuits alleging that a preservative in some vaccines called thimerosal causes 
autism and other diseases.”). 
 112 See id. at 11–13; see also James T. O’Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Effects of 
Counter-Terrorism Pressure upon Medical Product Approvals, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 
336 n.33 (2004) (“This uncertainty is inherent in the antidote research effort, but it makes the 
investor less willing to support the development costs and it expands the company’s liability 
concerns.”). 
 113 See Temko, supra note 108, at 12–13; PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, 
FOOD AND DRUG LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 514 (2d ed. 1991); Janene Boyce, Disclosure of 
Clinical Trial Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act Should Be Restored, 
2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, 8. See also James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the 
Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 261, 340 (2002) (“The foregoing process of drug 
approval takes at least seven years.”); Crossing the Valley of Death: Bringing Promising Medical 
Countermeasures to BioShield: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and Pub. Health 
Preparedness of the Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 17 (2005) 
(“[F]ewer than one in one hundred candidate drugs will receive approval by the FDA for 
Investigational New Drug (IND) status, and of those, only about one in four will receive 
approval by the FDA. Second, once a product receives IND approval, it may take 8–10 years 
and $500–$800 million or more to support the clinical trials and development manufacturing 
processes to bring a product to market. This does not include the research investment to 
develop candidate products.”) (prepared statement of Colonel Joseph Palma, M.D., USAF). As 
discussed infra note 294, there is precedent for providing expedited review for orphan drugs 
and drugs for neglected diseases through the use of tradeable vouchers. 
 114 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-88, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO AVOID REPEATING PAST PROBLEMS WITH PROCURING NEW ANTHRAX VACCINE 
AND MANAGING THE STOCKPILE OF LICENSED VACCINE (2007), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
270/268295.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7DG-L4VA]. According to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office: 
Three major factors contributed to the failure of the first Project BioShield 
procurement effort for an rPA anthrax vaccine. First, HHS’s Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) awarded the procurement contract 
 
Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/17/2019  6:14 PM 
2018] P RE P A R IN G  FO R T H E  A PO C A L YPS E  855 
 Sixth, the PHSBPRA did not reduce the bureaucratic governmental 
red tape private firms had to cut through to finalize the government 
procurement contracts. Indeed, private executives complained that 
government officials were changing the requirements and delaying 
contracts.115 Seventh, the PHSBPRA failed to establish an effective 
delivery system for the distribution of drugs and vaccines in a large-
scale crisis even if it had an adequate supply stockpiled.116 Finally, Eliah 
Zerhouni and Anthony Fauci, the directors of the NIH and National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), were criticized for 
putting too much emphasis on government research. 
C.     BARDA and OTA 
 To address the shortfalls of the BioShield program and further 
encourage the development and procurement of CBRN medical 
countermeasures, Congress passed the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) in 2006. PAHPA created the Biomedical 
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and 
established the position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
 
to VaxGen, a small biotechnology firm, while VaxGen was still in the early stages of 
developing a vaccine and had not addressed many critical manufacturing issues. This 
award preempted critical development work on the vaccine. Also, the contract 
required VaxGen to deliver 25 million doses of the vaccine in 2 years, which would 
have been unrealistic even for a larger manufacturer. Second, VaxGen took 
unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms. VaxGen officials told GAO that they 
accepted the contract despite significant risks due to (1) the aggressive delivery time 
line for the vaccine, (2) VaxGen’s lack of in-house technical expertise—a condition 
exacerbated by the attrition of key company staff as the contract progressed—and (3) 
VaxGen’s limited options for securing any additional funding needed. Third, 
important Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements regarding the type of 
data and testing required for the rPA anthrax vaccine to be eligible for use in an 
emergency were not known at the outset of the procurement contract. In addition, 
ASPR’s anticipated use of the rPA anthrax vaccine was not articulated to all parties 
clearly enough and evolved over time. Finally, according to VaxGen, the purchase of 
BioThrax for the stockpile as a stopgap measure raised the bar for the VaxGen 
vaccine. All these factors created confusion over the acceptance criteria for VaxGen’s 
product and significantly diminished VaxGen’s ability to meet contract time lines. 
Id. 
 115 See Temko, supra note 108, at 34–35. 
 116 See id. at 39. 
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Since then, BARDA has made substantial progress closing the 
innovation gap by stimulating R&D through public-private partnerships 
with various stakeholders, including industry. 
1.     Other Transaction Authority 
 Since 2013, BARDA has provided non-dilutive funding and 
technical advisory support to its partners pursuant to a flexible 
government contracting vehicle, the OTA.117 OTA collaborators are not 
required to comply with the typical lengthy and time-consuming 
procurement requirements or to change their standard business 
practices.118 Given the flexibility inherent in collaborations governed by 
OTA, the federal government can also accommodate the various 
licensing (and collaboration) terms and conditions that a company may 
already have in place with its partners, including licensors’ account 
rights.119 
 When using its OTA, BARDA is not required to comply with the 
multitude of laws, regulations, and other requirements that normally 
apply to standard procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative 
agreements. As a result, the turnaround time is shorter, “with less 
internal paperwork than normally would be the case.”120 Thus, used 
correctly, OTA contracts can attract leading-edge, biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies and academics to collaborate with federal 
funding agencies to participate in BARDA-funded R&D programs in 
situations where they otherwise would not do so. 
 OTA arrangements permit BARDA to take the “portfolio 
approach” that industry and venture capitalists use to fund R&D by 
diversifying investments, funding multiple rounds dependent upon 
success,121 and not trying to pick a national champion.122 BARDA is 
 
 117 See Kuyath, supra note 34, at 522–24.  
 118 Id. at 536. 
 119 See id. at 523. 
 120 See id. at 524; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-209, FEDERAL 
ACQUISITIONS: USE OF ‘OTHER TRANSACTION’ AGREEMENTS LIMITED AND MOSTLY FOR 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674534.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PP5A-K4Y2] (“[A]gencies told GAO the authority allowed them to develop 
customized agreements . . . . This flexibility allowed agencies to address concerns regarding 
intellectual property and cost accounting provisions . . . .”). 
 121 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 94, at 438–95. 
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accordingly able to support a “company’s [and the government’s] effort 
to simultaneously and in parallel develop multiple drug candidates.”123 
2.     Use of OTA to Form Public-Private Partnerships 
 Both DARPA and BARDA have used OTA to establish public-
private partnerships to deal with technological challenges. Public-
private partnerships are “contractual agreements between a public 
agency or public-sector authority and a private-sector entity that allow 
for greater private participation in the delivery of public services, or in 
developing an environment that improves the quality of life for the 
general public.”124 In order to develop a public-private partnership,125 
the conventional community of stakeholders is expanded to include the 
private sector (emerging and established firms); management; academia 
and research communities; industry and economic development 
organizations; federal, state, regional, and local governments; and the 
financial sector, including investment banks, angel groups, and venture 
capital groups. This is in addition to the traditional stakeholder groups, 
which include customers, employees, creditors, suppliers, and 
shareholders. 
 Agreements reached through the use of a government agency’s 
OTA have formed the basis for pharmaceutical public-private 
partnerships with large pharmaceutical companies, such as 
GlaxoSmithKline (2013), AstraZeneca (2015), the Medicines Company 
 
 122 See Christopher Houchens & Joseph Larsen, The Role of the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in Promoting Innovation in Antibacterial 
Product Development, AMR CONTROL (Aug. 2, 2017), http://resistancecontrol.info/2017/the-
role-of-the-biomedical-advanced-research-and-development-authority-barda-in-promoting-
innovation-in-antibacterial-product-development [https://perma.cc/C535-H38N]. 
 123 Id. (“Such portfolio-based funding is also more consistent with industry practice and 
reduces technical risk by allowing for the reallocation of resources across activities and among 
drug candidates if technical or business risks materialize, thereby increasing the probability of 
bringing a successful drug to market.”). 
 124 Louis Witters et al., The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving Innovation, in THE 
GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2012: STRONGER INNOVATION LINKAGES FOR GLOBAL GROWTH 81 
(Soumitra Dutta ed., 2012), https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/userfiles/file/GII-2012-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN2E-MRWE]. 
 125 Anat Alon-Beck developed the Coalition Model in her dissertation. See Alon-Beck, supra 
note 23. 
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and Hoffmann-La Roche (both 2016), and Pfizer (2017).126 OTAs have 
also been used to enter into international collaborations with other 
funding agencies, such as the European Union’s IMI (to co-fund the 
development of one of AstraZeneca’s lead antibacterial candidates), and 
to jointly support other product development.127 Finally, OTA contracts 
have made it possible for the U.S. government and its contractors to 
enter into consortiums.128 
 For example, as discussed further below,129 BARDA and the NIH’s 
NIAID used OTA to create the Global Combating Antibiotic Resistant 
 
 126 See Michael J. Eichberg, Public Funding of Clinical-Stage Antibiotic Development in the 
United States and European Union, 13 HEALTH SECURITY 156 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4486734/pdf/hs.2014.0081.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTH-QN6Y]; see 
Houchens & Larsen, supra note 122. 
 127 As Bagley & Tvarnø explain:  
The IMI acts as a neutral third party supporting open-source, public-private research 
projects in the EU involving large biopharmaceutical companies that are members of 
the EFPIA, small and medium enterprises, patients’ organizations, universities, other 
research organizations, hospitals, and regulatory agencies with the aim of improving 
drug development. The IMI is governed by Council Regulation (EC) No. 73/2008 on 
the establishment of the IMI Joint Undertaking (IMI-JU), the IMIJU financial rules, 
as well as other European Community and European Union law. The IMI grant 
agreement of 2011 comprises eleven articles and several appendices concerning the 
parties, research management, the scope and duration of the project, reports, budget 
and financial contribution, communication, applicable law and the competent court 
of jurisdiction. The grant agreement allows introduction of special clauses but does 
not itself include clauses promoting joint utility. 
Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 400. See, e.g., Council Regulation 73/2008, Setting Up the 
Joint Undertaking for the Implementation of the Joint Technology Initiative on Innovative 
Medicines, 2008 O.J. (L 30) 38 (EC); IMI Joint Undertaking Model Grant Agreement Core 3–4, 
https://www.imi.europa.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/apply-for-funding/call-
documents/imi1/IMI_Grant_Agreement_rev2011_Core.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2A8-MFD2]. 
On joint support of other product development, see Houchens & Larsen, supra note 122. 
 128 See, e.g., DoD Seeks to Establish Consortium for CBRN Countermeasures, Diagnostics, 
GLOBAL BIODEFENSE (May 20, 2015), https://globalbiodefense.com/2015/05/20/dod-seeks-to-
establish-consortium-for-cbrn-countermeasures-diagnostics [https://perma.cc/UYR6-B4T8] 
(“The DoD’s Joint Project Manager for Medical Countermeasure Systems (JPM-MCS), part of 
the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, is seeking to establish 
a consortium for advanced development efforts to support defense medical pharmaceutical and 
diagnostic requirements.”); see also Special Operations Forces Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction OTA, CBRNE CENT. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://cbrnecentral.com/special-operations-
forces-countering-weapons-mass-destruction-ota/10789 [https://perma.cc/SVC2-W4X8] (“The 
U.S. Army has released a competitive solicitation to establish an agreement with a single new or 
established consortium to develop and mature technologies which support Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).”). 
 129 See infra text accompanying notes 210–13. 
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Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X).130 In another effort 
“to accelerate research, development, and availability of transformative 
countermeasures to protect Americans,” BARDA announced the 
creation of the Division of Research, Innovation, and Ventures (DRIVe) 
in June 2018.131 According to Steve Brozak: 
Unlike the current funding mechanisms the government uses, it 
seems that DRIVe will act more like a strategic investor in private 
and public companies in addition to being a grant maker. This means 
that the new division may be able to make direct investments into 
companies BARDA would like to partner with and derive value by 
holding equity or equity-like instruments in the venture. Investing in 
opportunities in this manner offers a pathway to renew funds to 
reinvest into other ventures deemed essential to the national 
interest.132 
Notwithstanding the promise of initiatives like CARB-X and DRIVe, the 
federal government’s policies in effect since 2001133 have not provided 
sufficient incentives for private biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies to engage in the development of countermeasures, with few 
companies advancing “candidates through clinical trials, and fewer 
still . . . likely to market products.”134 
 
 130 Gates Foundation, UK Commit Nearly $52 Million to Fight Superbugs, PHILANTHROPY 
NEWS DIG. (May 23, 2018), http://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/gates-foundation-uk-
commit-nearly-52-million-to-fight-superbugs [https://perma.cc/RZ6J-PJN4] [hereinafter Gates 
Foundation].  




 132 Id. 
 133 See Matheny et al., supra note 12, at 228–31; see also Clarence Lam et al., Billions for 
Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2006–FY2007, 4 BIOSECURITY & 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 113 (2006). 
 134 See Matheny et al., supra note 12, at 228 (“Out of 11 requests for proposals issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for biodefense countermeasures, only six 
products have been procured—none from a large pharmaceutical firm.”); see also id. tbl.2; 
Melanie C. Trull et al., Turning Biodefense Dollars into Products, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
179, 180 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROJECT BIOSHIELD ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS: AUGUST 2006–JULY 2007 5 (2007). 
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D.     The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
 Following the events of 9/11, the Center for Law and the Public’s 
Health at Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University 
prepared and published a Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
(MSEHPA).135 As a result of public criticism,136 they subsequently 
introduced a second draft.137 As of July 1, 2004, thirty-four states and 
the District of Columbia had enacted some form of the MSEHPA, and it 
was under consideration by another nine states.138 As with the first 
version, various civil rights groups criticized the second draft for 
providing excessive powers to state governors at the expense of 
individual rights, and for allocating primary responsibility for 
responding to a bioterrorism attack to underfunded and undertrained 
individual state health departments ill-equipped to manage the after-
effects of such an attack.139 We agree that a national response regime is 
necessary. 
III.     DEFENSE OF HEALTH COUNTERMEASURES INITIATIVE 
 We call on the U.S. government to build on the success of DARPA 
and BARDA and the effective use of OTA to establish the Defense of 
Health Countermeasures Initiative. The DHCI builds on the concept 
that the government needs to be a key risk-taker and invest in 
 
 135 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S 
HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., Proposed Draft Oct. 23, 2001), https://
biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/MSEHPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6KN-EMXW]. 
 136 See Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/
other/model-state-emergency-health-powers-act [https://perma.cc/BJW9-UMM4] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018); Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), NAT’L VACCINE INFO. 
CTR., https://www.nvic.org/Vaccine-Laws/model-state-emergency-health-powers-act.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5RBA-F545](last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 137 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB.’S 
HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 2001), http://
www.aapsonline.org/legis/msehpa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHW4-RKB5]. 
 138 Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Toward 
State Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 97 (2005), https://
lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1204&context=annals [https://perma.cc/
GW28-5AK2]. 
 139 Id. 
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knowledge, human capital, and innovation to encourage knowledge 
spillovers.140  
 The DHCI includes the creation of a public-private network of 
“ecosystems of excellence,”141 comprising triads of universities and other 
research institutions, private pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms 
and private investors, and government actors, to form incubators for the 
development of effective CBRN countermeasures (Incubators or 
DHCIIs). The DHCI is designed to complement, and not to replace, the 
private market efforts in financing and growing emerging growth firms, 
new technology, and applications. It allows the government to make 
direct equity investments in seed projects (ideas that are promising 
bases for a new company or expansion of an existing firm) within a 
short period of time (usually within two but sometimes within up to five 
years), while also encouraging private intermediaries to participate in 
the financing and management of the funded companies.  
 Precedents include the National Science Foundation’s University-
Industry Demonstration Partnership and the NIH’s Roadmap 
Initiatives, which have been “integral to engaging academia in drug 
discovery research and have been effectively leveraged to help bridge the 
chasm between basic research activities and the commercialization of a 
drug.”142 More recently, in 2012, the Obama Administration created 
Partnerships to Accelerate Therapeutics “to identify and resolve 
bottlenecks and speed the development of life-saving medicines through 
synergistic alliances involving industry, academia, government, and 
disease foundations.”143 
 
 140 See AUDRETSCH, supra note 74, at 9–10; LERNER, supra note 24, at 13, 71. 
 141 See Teece, supra note 24, at 104; see also Mike Alvarez Cohen, Strategies for Developing 
University Innovation Ecosystems: An Analysis, Segmentation and Frame-Work Based on 
Somewhat Non-Intuitive and Slightly Controversial Findings, 51 LES NOUVELLES 184 (2016) 
(defining “university innovation ecosystems” as “applied research, entrepreneurship education, 
technology transfer, idea incubators, startup accelerators, new venture competitions, mentor 
networks, industry collaborations, and venture capital resources”). Cohen found that “the top 
ecosystems have strong pools of innovative and entrepreneurial students, faculty and staff” and 
“relatively decentralized entrepreneurship-related activities, not top-down centralized control 
of activities.” Id. at 185. For a discussion of the cybersecurity ecosystem of excellence in San 
Diego, California, see infra note 277. 
 142 Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xxi. 
 143 Id. at xx. 
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A.     Technology Innovation and Business Incubators: In General 
 A key element of the DHCI is the use of technology innovation and 
business incubators to encourage innovation by serving the needs of 
entrepreneurs (and seed stage companies) and by providing them with 
access to the resources required to successfully grow their ideas.144 
Joseph Mancuso established the first U.S. business incubator, the 
Batavia Industrial Center in Batavia, New York, in 1959.145 For the 
purpose of this Article, the term “business incubator program” is taken 
from the working definition provided by David A. Lewis, Elsie Harper-
Anderson, and Lawrence A. Molnar, to mean the following: 
Business incubation programs are designed to accelerate the 
successful development of entrepreneurial companies through an 
array of business support resources and services, developed or 
orchestrated by the incubator manager, and offered both in the 
incubator and through its network of contacts. A business incubation 
program’s main goal is to produce successful firms that will leave the 
program financially viable and freestanding. Critical to the definition 
of an incubator is the provision of management guidance, technical 
assistance, and consulting tailored to the needs of new enterprises.146 
As of 2014, there were an estimated 7,000 incubators worldwide.147  
 There are different forms of technology and business incubators, 
which can generally be divided into four types, ranging from “virtual 
incubators”148 (with no walls), “incubators with walls,”149 and 
 
 144 The use of the “technology business incubators” as a strategic development tool in the 
United States became popular in the mid-1980s. 
 145 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 13 (“The first U.S. business 
incubator opened in 1959, when Joseph Mancuso started the Batavia Industrial Center in 
Batavia, New York. Since that time, business incubation programs have emerged as successful 
economic development tools throughout the country and around the world. As of October 
2006, approximately 1,400 business incubators operated in North America, including 1,115 in 
the U.S.”). 
 146 Id. at 5. 
 147 Bjørn Petter Bjercke, Business Incubators as a Resource Provider 1 (July 2015) 
(unpublished thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology), https://
brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2364869/13128_FULLTEXT.pdf?sequence=1 
[https://perma.cc/PFG4-CGVA]. 
 148 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 15. The terms “virtual 
incubators” and “[i]ncubators without walls” are synonymous. These incubators are: 
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“accelerators,”150 to “international incubators.”151 For the reasons set 
forth in Section III.C below, we recommend incubators with walls, that 
is, incubators with shared-use facilities. 
 
[B]usiness incubators that do not offer on-site space for clients, although they may 
have a central office to coordinate services, house the management staff, meet with 
clients, and perhaps even provide conference rooms for clients. Virtual incubators 
may or may not be located in the same geographic area as their client companies, 
since a virtual presence is what defines an incubator without walls. Virtual 
incubation programs tend to be less expensive to operate than traditional business 
incubators that have additional expenses related to the operation and management of 
a physical plant. In rural areas—where the client base is often spread out over large 
areas, making commutes difficult—virtual incubation may be a good alternative. 
Also, some entrepreneurs prefer not to locate in an incubator facility because they 
already have established offices elsewhere or need access to specialized equipment or 
facilities not present in the incubator. For these firms, virtual incubation or 
participation in an affiliate program at an incubation program with walls is a better 
option. One significant challenge of virtual incubation is encouraging networking 
among clients. Having strong networks provides an environment that facilitates peer-
to-peer learning, mutual support, and potential collaboration, as well as 
camaraderie—all of which are critical to client success. In addition, having clients 
located in close proximity within the incubator facility makes it easier for the 
incubator staff to deliver entrepreneurial support services. Some have compared 
virtual incubation with well-operated Small Business Development Centers. As with 
incubators with walls, virtual business incubation programs also face significant 
funding challenges. 
Id. 
 149 See id. (“An incubator with walls is a business incubation program with a multitenant 
business incubator facility and on-site management. Although an incubator with walls offers 
entrepreneurs space in which to operate their businesses, the focus of the program remains on 
the business assistance services provided to the start-ups, not on the building itself.”). 
 150 See id. at 16 (stating that there is no definitive definition of business accelerator in the 
literature). The term may be generally defined  
either as: (1) a late-stage incubation program, assisting entrepreneurial firms that are 
more mature and ready for external financing; or (2) a facility that houses a modified 
business incubation program designed for incubator graduates as they ease into the 
market. A third definition—which is both more expansive and less measurable—is 
similar to the virtual incubator model. Finally, some industry professionals use the 
terms business incubator and business accelerator interchangeably. 
Id. In this Article, we use the definition provided by Cohen, Bingham, and Hallen: accelerators, 
such as Y Combinator (Silicon Valley) and Techstars (Boston, Boulder, London, and Seattle), 
are “short-term, limited duration, cohort-based educational programs for nascent ventures” 
that provide intense and quick mentoring for entrepreneurs who start and end the program 
together. Susan L. Cohen, Christopher B. Bingham & Benjamin L. Hallen, The Role of 
Accelerator Designs in Mitigating Bounded Rationality in New Ventures, ADMIN. SCI. Q. (July 
2018), at 1, 3, 5–6, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0001839218782131 [https://
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 For example, the University of Connecticut’s Technology 
Incubation Program (TIP) operates two of the largest incubators in the 
United States, one in Farmington, Connecticut, next to its medical, 
nursing, and dental schools, specializing in life sciences, and a second 
near its main campus in Storrs, Connecticut, specializing in computer 
science and related high technology. TIP offers: 
[1] Incubator facilities featuring wet labs and access to 
instrumentation 
[2] Collaboration with Scientific Experts 
[3] Technically trained employees, fellows, interns and 
graduates 
[4] The university’s world-class library resources [and] 
[5] Customized business planning and mentoring.152 
 
perma.cc/ZM86-2WPA]. An accelerator can have cohorts ranging from 6 to 125 start-ups. Id. 
at 6. Typically, the accelerator receives 6–8% of the equity of each participant in exchange for a 
$15,000 to $20,000 cash investment. Id. Since the first accelerator in the United States was 
created in 2005, approximately 6,000 start-ups nurtured in 650 accelerators have collectively 
raised more than $30 billion in capital. Id. at 5–6. 
 151 There appears to be no clear and generally accepted definition of the terms “international 
business incubator” or “international accelerator” in the literature. Additionally, there is scant 
empirical research or evaluation of these models. LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra 
note 76, at 16. As Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar explain, an international form of 
business incubation program has recently emerged to help foreign firms to enter the U.S. 
market: 
[I]nternational business incubators provide the same set of entrepreneurial services 
as a typical incubator, but they concentrate on providing a “soft landing” for 
international firms that want to access U.S. markets, partner with U.S. firms, or 
access other resources. Some specialized services offered by international incubators 
that are above and beyond typical business incubation services include translation 
services, language training, help obtaining business and driver’s licenses, cultural 
training, immigration and visa assistance, and housing assistance. Immigration 
services are often extended to trailing spouses and children, making it easier for 
foreign entrepreneurs to settle into their new location. 
Id. at 16–17. 
 152 Wet Labs & Offices, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT: OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR 
RESEARCH, https://tip.uconn.edu/availablespace [https://perma.cc/3DW8-8B9Q] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018). There are also resident entrepreneurs and legal counsel available to assist the 
startups. Telephone Interview by Constance E. Bagley with Mostafa Analoui, Executive 
Director, Venture Development at the University of Connecticut’s Technology Incubation 
Program (April 9, 2018). 
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 B.     The Israeli Technology Incubator Program 
 The Israeli government, acting through the Israeli Office of the 
Chief Scientist (OCS), established the Technology Incubator Program 
whereby it created twenty-eight technology incubators with shared-use 
facilities between the years of 1991 and 1993.153 Designed to help build 
successful firms that could leave the incubator in relatively short order 
in a financially and organizationally self-sustained and viable state,154 
the program spurred the innovation and cross-fertilization necessary to 
develop Israel’s high technology industry.155 It also provided 
employment for the engineers and scientists who had immigrated to 
Israel from the former Soviet Union,156 as well as laid-off engineers from 
the military sector.157 By providing shared-use facilities and short-term 
financial and other support to individuals and early-stage companies 
with a promising idea,158 the incubators “transformed” engineers into 
technological entrepreneurs.159 Finally, the program forged links and 
 
 153  See Frenkel et al., infra note 155, at 189. 
 154 Manuel Trajtenberg, R&D Policy in Israel: An Overview and Reassessment 10 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7930, 2000). As Trajtenberg explained: 
[The] premise is that the technological incubator would significantly enhance the 
entrepreneur’s prospects of raising further capital, finding strategic partners, and 
emerging from the incubator with businesses that can stand on their own. Of course, 
this initial stage is the riskiest, and certainly in the early 1990s there were virtually no 
other sources of finance in Israel for such ventures. 
Id. 
 155 See Amnon Frenkel et al., Public Versus Private Technological Incubator Programmes: 
Privatizing the Technological Incubators in Israel, 16 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 189 (2005). 
 156 See id. According to Trajtenberg: 
Many of these immigrants were scientists and skilled professionals that came to Israel 
with highly valuable human capital as well as with plenty of ideas for innovative 
products. However, they were lacking in virtually all other dimensions required for 
commercial success, from knowledge of the relevant languages (e.g. Hebrew and 
English) and of commercial practices in western economies, to managerial skills and 
access to capital. Even though it targeted new immigrants, the program is open to all. 
Trajtenberg, supra note 154, at 10.  
 157 See DANIEL SHEFER & AMNON FRENKEL, AN EVALUATION OF THE ISRAELI 
TECHNOLOGICAL INCUBATOR PROGRAM AND ITS PROJECTS 2–3 (2002), http://ifise.unipv.it/
Download/final-draft3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW4V-2QX5]. 
 158 In Israel, incubators usually provide seed capital to entrepreneurs, whereas venture-
capital funds provide start-up capital to an existing firm. Id. at 3. 
 159 See id. at 2–3. 
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promoted cooperation among entrepreneurs, academic institutions, 
private industry, and government procurement officials.160 The 
incubators had no industrial sector designation or limitation, and any 
university or research institution, local municipality, or large private 
firm could sponsor a project.161 Their geographic locations ranged from 
metropolitan areas to more remote regions.162 
 Each incubator’s manager, often with the assistance of a group of 
professional advisors, was responsible for selecting eight to twelve 
projects from multiple applicants who were subject to a rigorous 
screening process.163 To be accepted, the idea underlying the project had 
to be based on innovative R&D that was capable of being 
commercialized and exported to an appropriate market within a 
reasonable period of time.164 
1.     Governance 
 Initially, the Israeli technology incubators were organized as not-
for-profit quasi-governmental entities.165 They were governed by an 
incubator manager, as well as by public actors, such as government 
officials, municipalities, research institutions, and universities.166  
 
 160 The academic peer review of the research underlying the applicants’ proposals helped the 
incubator’s managers gauge whether the idea or project in question could be commercialized in 
a timely manner, thereby strengthening the relationship between academic research and private 
industry. 
 161 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3. 
 162 See id. at 4. As Frenkel et al. explain:  
The aim of the technological incubator programme, as a development programme 
“from below”, is to foster entrepreneurial activities from the very beginning of a 
project’s initiation. Therefore, the incubator has the advantages and drawbacks 
typical of this kind of programme. It can help to create a healthy entrepreneurial 
culture by empowering local people and encouraging them to develop their own 
firms locally. A technological incubator located in a remote region may be able to 
provide a number of functions that are seldom found in peripheral areas, such as VC 
supply, business and legal consultation, and the filtering of valuable ideas. Obviously, 
however, it cannot help in increasing the supply of skilled labour. 
Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 192–93. 
 163 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3. 
 164 See id. at 11. 
 165 Catarina Wylie, Vision in Venture: Israel’s High-Tech Incubator Program, 10 CELL CYCLE 
855 (2011). 
 166 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3–4. 
Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/17/2019  6:14 PM 
2018] P RE P A R IN G  FO R T H E  A PO C A L YPS E  867 
 Following the selection process, the incubator’s manager and its 
professional advisors were responsible for working with the 
entrepreneur167 to draft a “project folder,” which was then submitted to 
the incubator’s steering committee for approval.168 The steering 
committee was typically chaired by the incubator’s manager and usually 
comprised members from the following stakeholder groups: research 
institutions and academia, industry representatives, and community 
leaders.169 
2.     Financing Mechanisms and Services Provided 
 The Israeli government provided financial support both to the 
incubator’s management, as well as to the program’s participants. 
Annual grants to the incubator’s management of up to $175,000 per 
year were available.170 The government also provided grants of up to 
$150,000 per year, for a maximum of two years, to each seed company 
participating in the program.171 
 Subject to that upper limit of $150,000, the Israeli government 
limited the grants it allocated to each seed company to not more than 
85% of that company’s approved project budget.172 As a result, the 
entrepreneur was responsible for obtaining non-government financing 
for the remaining 15% of the project budget, termed the 
“complementary financing.”173 The entrepreneur could (1) contribute 
that amount directly to the project, (2) raise that amount from a non-
government party, or (3) provide some combination of self-funding and 
non-governmental financing.174 Research in 2003 showed that founders 
 
 167 The entrepreneur seeking approval of a project to commercialize a promising idea often 
will not have formed a separate entity, such as a corporation, before being accepted by the 
incubator. Id. at 3–4. When able to afford to pay the organizational costs, the entrepreneur may 
form a start-up firm with minimal capital before applying to the incubator. In this Article, we 
use the terms “entrepreneur,” “founder,” “seed company,” “fledgling company,” and “start-up” 
interchangeably unless the context clearly requires otherwise. 
 168 Id. at 3. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 193. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. (“From a small annual budget of $2 million at the beginning in 1991, the 
technological incubator programme increased its annual budget to $32 million in 2002. As of 
 
Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/17/2019  6:14 PM 
868 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 40:823 
had successfully obtained non-government financing for their incubator 
projects from private investors in exchange for a share of the equity in 
the project and by collecting fees from “royalties, sale of shares and 
dividends, and strategic partnerships.”175  
 If the “incubated” firm was successful in commercializing its 
project, then it was obligated to repay the government “priming” grant 
by paying royalties to the Israeli government. If a new venture failed, 
however, then neither the entrepreneur nor the entity formed to pursue 
the project was required to repay the money the government had 
contributed to the project.176 
3.     Annual Evaluations and Possibility of Additional Governmental 
Support in Rare Cases 
 Each of the projects accepted into the incubator program was 
evaluated on a yearly basis. As noted above, government funding and 
other support were almost always limited to not more than two years 
after the venture commenced operations.177 In limited circumstances, 
mainly when the evaluators concluded that the project was well-
managed but was in a field like the biotech that required a longer 
 
2003, total government grants to the programme amounted to $285 million . . . . At the end of 
2003, more than 200 projects were in operation in incubators, which employed more than 2,000 
workers. One third of the initiatives were based on ideas brought by new immigrants, all of 
whom had an academic education (most with a Master’s or PhD degree).”). 
 175 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 55. Shefer and Frenkel assessed the successes 
of the Israeli technological incubator Program in 2003, which was ten years following its 
establishment. See Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 193. They concluded that generally the 
program had fulfilled its purpose, because approximately 86.4% of the projects (during the 
years 1999–2001) had graduated from the program, and 78% of these projects were able to 
secure immediate financial support. Id. According to Frenkel, Shefer, and Miller, these statistics 
indicated that the programs were successful. Id. It should be noted, however, that incubators 
located in geographic areas considered to be the periphery experienced lower levels and rates of 
success than programs located in more central regions. Id. According to Frenkel, Shefer, and 
Miller, these findings suggested that vast government support was still needed in the initial 
stages of incubator programs. Id. However, government support in the programs can be 
gradually reduced over time, especially once private financing sources are available. Id. Yet, 
there is a caveat, as it appears that technological incubators located in peripheral regions 
require more public support for a longer period of time than incubators located in central 
regions of the country. Id. 
 176 See SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 15, 55. 
 177 See id. at 3–4. 
Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/17/2019  6:14 PM 
2018] P RE P A R IN G  FO R T H E  A PO C A L YPS E  869 
incubation period, then a third year of government support might be 
granted.178 
4.     Privatization in 2002 
 The Israeli technological incubator program initiated in 1991 was 
privatized in 2002 and converted into public-private partnerships, 
which were organized in the form of incubator joint companies.179 Once 
the private sector was able to provide adequate private capital for the 
incubators on reasonable terms, policy makers concluded that 
government funding was no longer necessary.180 
 The incubator joint company reduced its percentage of equity 
shares (which were not tradable) by increasing capital from external 
investment.181 Wholly privately-owned incubator models then started to 
emerge in Israel.182 
 After the privatization, there was a dramatic rise in the success 
rates of entrepreneurial firms that participated in the private or quasi-
public technology incubator programs.183 Success rates were measured 
by the ability of entrepreneurial firms, after graduation from the 
incubator program, to obtain subsequent funding as well as to continue 
growing their operations.184 Following graduation, many companies 
were able to create more jobs and attract international venture capital 
funds.185 
 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Frenkel et al., supra note 155, at 194. 
 180 See id. According to Frenkel et al.: 
Privatization means a reduction in the government’s role in producing goods and 
services, as well as limiting its control and regulation of the economy. . . . It is 
commonly understood that government usually does not manage its resources 
efficiently. Therefore, public companies will be less efficient than private companies. 
Thus, turning public companies into private enterprises could increase their 
efficiency and, thereby, the efficiency of the whole economic system . . . . Results have 
shown, though, that privatization increases efficiency and innovation if it is done in a 
wise manner. 
Id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
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 The Israeli government further privatized the programs by 
establishing a franchise system, whereby the government licensed the 
public and quasi-public incubators to experienced equity investment 
firms.186 Such firms extensively invested in the incubator start-up 
projects, providing both capital and management support.187 Since 2002, 
the franchise model used a new repayment mechanism.188 Originally, 
the Israeli government provided funding for projects directly to the 
public technological incubator program.189 In that way, the program was 
the agent in charge of transferring the government funding to the 
individual companies. Moreover, the program, not the start-up firm, 
was accountable for repaying the grant, usually within a four-year 
period from the date in which the start-up firm graduated from the 
program.190 To guarantee that the money would be repaid, the Israeli 
government held shares in each of the funded start-up firms. If the 
incubator did not repay the grant on time, the government had the right 
to decide whether or not to sell its stake in the start-up. According to 
Yossi Smoler, Director of the Technological Incubators Program, the 
repayment mechanism was “too complex and wasn’t something in 
which the government wanted to be involved.”191 Today, the 
government allocates funds directly to the start-up company, and the 
company pays off the amount via royalties and interest (usually 3–5% of 
revenues plus a market rate of interest).192 
5.     Results 
 The Israeli technology incubator programs exceeded the initial 
goals of their founders, facilitating the development of a world-class, 
high-tech industry in Israel. The execution of the mission of the Office 
of Chief Scientist (OCS) to encourage cross-regional cooperation on 
innovation was and continues to be extremely successful. The OCS 
continues to expand its R&D initiatives with international partners (via 
 
 186 Wylie, supra note 165, at 855–56 (quoting Yossi Smoler, Director of Israel’s 
Technological Incubators Program).  
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 855–56. 
 190 Id. at 856. 
 191 Id. at 856. 
 192 Id. 
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bilateral or multilateral cooperation) and contribute to the expansion of 
global innovative markets. Among these expanding markets are the 
United States, China, and India.193  
C.     Proposed Structure of DHCI Incubators 
 Each of the DHCI Incubators (DCHIIs) will have its own 
differentiating characteristics, which will depend on its regional and 
historical influences, as well as its stakeholders and purpose.194 At a 
minimum, as stated by Ferid Murad, Nobel Laureate in Physiology and 
Medicine, “the collaborating parties must plan carefully, take the project 
seriously, define who does what, and honor their commitments in a 
timely fashion.”195 Although no single incubator structure or practice 
guarantees favorable results, we believe that, based on the Israeli 
experience and others studied by a variety of academics,196 the DHCIIs 
should include the following features. 
1.     Shared Use Facilities 
 The DHCIIs should typically be part of a shared-use facility, where 
multiple founders of new ventures are physically located. Shared 
physical space promotes networking, collaboration, and the transfer of 
both information and tacit knowledge.197 
 Many entrepreneurs lack the accumulated knowledge, deep 
networks, and industry peer groups available to seasoned managers of 
established firms.198 To handle the uncertainties and complexities 
 
 193 The Israel Innovation Authority (formerly called “Matimop”), the Israeli Industry Center 
for R&D, operates international R&D agreements on behalf of the OCS with Italy, Belgium, 
Ireland, Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, France, Sweden, Denmark, India, Turkey, 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Greece, China, Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ontario 
(Canada), Maryland (U.S.), and Victoria (Australia). United States, ISR. INNOVATION 
AUTHORITY, http://www.matimop.org.il/usa.html [https://perma.cc/F4VW-PB3T] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018). 
 194 For more suggestions, see KAO, supra note 68.  
 195 Ferid Murad, Foreword, in Chaguturu, supra note 1, at xvii–xviii. 
 196 Including, especially, the survey and analysis by Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar of 
the top performing incubation programs in the United States. LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & 
MOLNAR, supra note 76.  
 197 BJERCKE, supra note 147, at vi.  
 198 Cohen et al., supra note 150, at 4.  
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inherent in many new ventures, entrepreneurs may overuse bounded 
rationality, be too quick to reject alternative courses of action, and 
“settle” for what seems like a “good enough” outcome; they may also 
suffer from confirmation and other cognitive biases.199 Cohen, 
Bingham, and Hallen found, in a comparative study of accelerators, that 
by front-loading and concentrating the provision of expert advice, 
mentoring, and meetings with customers at the beginning of the 
program, by promoting transparency and information sharing among 
peer ventures in a cluster of innovation, and by standardizing focus, 
mentor meetings, peer gatherings, and other activities, the designers of 
accelerators were able to mitigate the adverse effects of oversized 
reliance on bounded rationality.200 We would expect a similar dynamic 
to occur with incubators.201 
 Consider, for example, LabCentral, in Cambridge, Massachusetts—
a shared-use, affordable, move-in-ready laboratory facility suitable for 
early-stage biotech research. Its founding sponsors include Triumvirate 
Environmental and Johnson & Johnson Innovation. It is a 70,000 
square-foot facility in the heart of the Kendall Square, Cambridge, 
biotech innovation hub—near Harvard University and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)—and was designed as a 
launchpad for high-potential life sciences and biotech start-ups. It offers 
fully permitted laboratory and office space for as many as sixty start-
ups, comprising approximately 200 scientists and entrepreneurs. It is a 
private, nonprofit institution, funded in part by two $5 million grants 
from the Massachusetts Life Sciences Center, with support from its real 
estate partner, MIT.202 
 
 199 Id. at 3–4. For a more detailed discussion of bounded rationality and the “satisficing” and 
cognitive biases that can accompany it, see Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). 
 200 Cohen et al., supra note 150. 
 201 Bjercke found that co-location does not guarantee collaboration among incubatees in 
part because collaboration requires mutual trust. BJERCKE, supra note 147, at vi. However, co-
location, when coupled with “proactive and continuous coaching” and the promotion by the 
incubator sponsor of knowledge sharing and collaboration among incubatees, resulted in 
greater access to resources. Id. 
 202 This entire paragraph is drawn from What Is LabCentral?, LABCENTRAL https://
labcentral.org/about/what-is-labcentral [https://perma.cc/6XKF-MTZZ] (last visited Nov. 11, 
2018). 
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 To quote Douglas Crawford, the associate director of a LabCentral 
affiliate QB3@953: 
Once [biotech entrepreneurs] are convinced that they should try to 
bring their work to market, either with or without bridging-the-gap 
funding, they are often astounded by the next mental adjustment: the 
amount [of] effort required to turn their attractive innovation into a 
useful product . . . . 
Besides securing intellectual property and developing a business 
plan, the budding entrepreneur must find a place[,] . . . supporting 
services, and access to needed resources.203 
2.     Sponsors: DARPA and the Proposed Central Health Incubators 
Bureau 
 The DHCI requires a federal government agency tasked with 
spearheading the Initiative and setting up the Incubators in various 
geographic regions across the United States. We recommend that 
Congress authorize DARPA, with input from BARDA, the FDA, and 
the NIH, to create the Central Health Incubators Bureau (CHIB).204 
CHIB will be in charge of heading the Initiative and making the final 
decisions on the projects to be selected to participate in the various 
Incubators. CHIB should include experts from the private and public 
sectors, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the World Health Organization, and the Red 
Cross. To avoid undue political interference, the members of CHIB 
should be granted the sort of independent authority given to the 
civilians chosen to determine which military bases should be closed after 
Congress decided that the United States no longer needed as many bases 
as it had during the Cold War.205 Otherwise, each government official 
would find it politically very difficult to vote to close the base in that 
official’s own geographic district regardless of its importance to the 
strategic defense of the United States. 
 
 203 Kenneth D. Harrison et al., Building a Life Sciences Innovation Ecosystem, 4 SCI. 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1–2 (2012). 
 204 This term is taken from the Israeli experience described supra in the text accompanying 
notes 153–93. 
 205 Jim Garamone, Why Civilian Control of the Military?, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE (May 2, 2001), 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45870 [https://perma.cc/PV84-WXWP]. 
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3.     Stakeholder Engagement 
 The shared facilities should be designed to encourage cooperation 
among not only the participating entrepreneurs but also between 
entrepreneurs and various stakeholder groups in ecosystems of 
excellence.206 For the purpose of the Initiative, the term “stakeholders” 
refers to the following groups of public and private partners that will 
have a role in forming and operating the Incubator: management, the 
private sector, academia, industry, government, the financial sector, and 
other traditional stakeholders.207 Accordingly, preferably, each 
Incubator will be located near established pharmaceutical and biotech 
firms, as well as research universities and other academic institutions 
with strong life sciences, engineering, and business departments, and 
will have access to military experts. As Robert Urban, Global Head of 
Johnson & Johnson Innovation, explains, “success requires density and 
proximity.”208 
 For example, CARB-X, created pursuant to the Combating 
Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria (CARB) plan President Obama released in 
 
 206 For a discussion of the Cyber Center of Excellence ecosystem in San Diego, California, 
see infra note 277.  
 207 In 2009–2010, the U.S. Small Business Administration launched and provided $14.7 
million in funding for a pilot program of ten contract-based innovation clusters in various 
states. They ranged from agriculture innovation and autonomous systems and cybersecurity in 
California to smart grid and efficient energy in Illinois to geospatial technology in Mississippi. 
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OVERVIEW: SBA INNOVATION CLUSTERS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://
www.clustermapping.us/sites/default/files/files/page/Overview%20-%20SBA%20Innovation
%20Clusters.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GXF-A8GV]. In just two years, participants in the ten 
clusters grew employment by 18%; increased revenues by 23%; raised more than $66 million in 
outside financing from venture capitalists, angel investors, and lenders; and secured more than 
$14 million in SBIR and STTR early-development awards. Id. at 5. In that same two-year 
period, small businesses in the ten clusters won contracts and subcontracts worth more than 
$807 million. Id. By 2013, the SBA and other agencies (including the Economic Development 
Agency, the Employment and Training Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture) had allocated a total of $214.6 million to fund fifty-six clusters 
(including the ten pilot clusters) ranging from the Advanced Manufacturing Jobs Accelerator to 
the Rural Jobs Accelerator. Id. at 2. 
 208 Telephone interview by Constance E. Bagley with Robert Urban, Global Head, Johnson & 
Johnson Innovation, on February 26, 2018. For more information about Johnson & Johnson 
Innovation and its incubators and partnerships, see About Us, JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
INNOVATION, https://www.jnjinnovation.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/9LX7-LXER] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
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2015,209 “brings together leaders in industry, philanthropy, government, 
and academia with the aim of rejuvenating the antimicrobial pipeline 
for the next 25 years.”210 Its participants include: 
(1) BARDA and the NIH’s NIAID are the U.S.-sponsoring 
governmental agencies. 
(2) Kevin Outterson, a leading health law researcher at 
Boston University who has collaborated in global projects 
to address antibiotic resistance, is the Executive Director.  
(3) The executive team “includes experts with decades of 
experience in antibiotic drug development, including John 
Rex, Senior Vice President at AstraZeneca,” and Barry 
Eisenstein from Merck. 
(4) NIAID “will provide in-kind services, including 
preclinical services, to projects that CARB-X supports. 
NIAID also is providing technical support for CARB-X 
from their internal subject matter experts in early stage 
antibiotic drug discovery and product development.” 
(5) MassBio and the California Life Sciences Institute “will 
provide world-class business support and mentoring 
services to innovative product developers selected for 
funding. The two accelerators will also share best practices 
with the Wellcome Trust and AMR Centre.” 
(6) The Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard University 
“will host a new inter-disciplinary Collaborative Hub for 
Early Antibiotic Discovery. This hub, aimed at early drug 
discovery, will work with multiple academic programs to 
advance promising antibiotic candidates that the CARB-X 
initiative can pursue.” 
(7) RTI International “will provide technical and regulatory 
support services to product developers in the partner 
 
 209 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Obama Administration Releases 
National Action Plan to Combat Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (Mar. 27, 2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-obama-administration-
releases-national-action-plan-combat-ant [https://perma.cc/DFS2-G7PA]; see also HSS 
Highlights Recent Progress Against Antibiotic Resistance, HEALIO (Nov. 17, 2017), https://
www.healio.com/infectious-disease/antimicrobials/news/online/%7B49c58212-a24a-467f-872b-
2ec69dafdfc8%7D/hss-highlights-recent-pro [https://perma.cc/3DZA-EPV9]. 
 210 CARB-X Global Partnership, B.U. SCH. LAW, www.bu.edu/law/faculty-scholarship/carb-x 
[https://perma.cc/8BV4-WUL3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
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accelerators as well as build and run the computing systems 
to identify, track, and monitor all research programs, 
including a real-time dashboard management information 
systems. RTI will evaluate all CARB-X operations to 
identify and share best practices across all partners and 
supporting continuous quality improvement.”211 Two 
nongovernmental organizations—the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation and the Wellcome Trust—will provide 
funding and other support.212 
CARB-X has raised more than $500 million in funding and has more 
than thirty-three projects underway.213 
4.     Structure of Incubators 
 The DHCIIs should be largely autonomous organizations, usually 
structured as not-for-profit corporations, B corporations, or limited 
liability companies with (1) limits on the transfer of equity ownership 
and on the transfer or licensing of assets; and (2) the right to buy back 
equity or reacquire assets and licensed rights at cost. Such ventures are 
able to “lock in” their assets by protecting their stakeholders from the 
risk of shareholders attempting to withdraw assets.214  
 It should be noted that an incubator for life sciences will be 
different from, say, a computer software incubator, both because the 
time from invention to commercialization is much longer and because 
the incubator will require academic peer review of marketable research 
to gauge the safety and efficacy of an idea or a project. As a result, it 
should reinforce the connection between academia and industry while 
ensuring that funds are distributed to research projects that are deemed 
worthy by scientists, not just business people seeking short-term 
profits.215 
 
 211 CARB-X, https://carb-x.org [https://perma.cc/8GG5-LTBR] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
 212 Id.; Gates Foundation, supra note 130. 
 213 Gates Foundation, supra note 130. For more information about CARB-X, see CARB-X, 
supra note 211. 
 214 See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 688–90 (2015). 
Stout’s theory is discussed further infra in text accompanying notes 280–81. 
 215 See Block, supra note 34, at 175, 177 (according to Block, the NIH officials and policy 
makers rely heavily on the peer review model, in which funds are distributed to research 
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5.     Financing 
 The DoD, the NIH, the CHIB, and other government agencies will 
provide seed funding for projects accepted by a DHCI in response to 
requests for proposals. Such grants will typically be limited to not more 
than two years.216 Because these projects are from the biotech field, a 
third year of government support could be granted under special 
circumstances and after due assessment.217 In contrast, projects 
supported by an accelerator would usually be funded for five months or 
less.218 
 Building on the Israeli incubator model, the funds should be 
invested in the portfolio companies in the Incubator and not given to 
the manager of the Incubator. However, in most cases, it will be the new 
venture, and not the government, that will own the technology with 
certain residual rights belonging to the academic institution and a 
portion of the royalties being payable to the inventors in accordance 
with the Bayh-Dole Act. The incubated firm will be required to repay 
the government grant once successful, perhaps (if one follows the Israeli 
model) with royalties equal to 3–5% of revenues plus market rate 
interest.219 If the new venture fails, however, then the government will 
not require repayment of the grants.220 Both the public and private 
participants should understand and acknowledge that it is very likely 
that entrepreneurs and start-up firms will fail several times before they 
reach a successful outcome in the biotech industry. 
 It will usually be necessary to raise additional funding from various 
local and regional stakeholder groups (such as colleges or universities, 
other government agencies, economic development groups, private 
industry, angel investors, venture capital and hedge funds, and any 
other potential sponsors of the Incubator). According to a study by 
Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar, public sector support contributes 
 
projects that were deemed worthy by scientists); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NAT’L ACADEMIES, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH PROGRAM 
AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2009), http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11455. 
 216 See Israeli example discussed in SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3. 
 217 See id. at 3–4. In theory, a fourth or fifth year of support might be provided. 
 218 Cohen et al., supra note 150, at 8. 
 219 See Israeli Incubator example in Wylie, supra note 165, at 856. 
 220 Id. 
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to the success of projects nurtured in an incubator.221 Moreover, 
incubators that enjoy larger budgets (in terms of both revenues and 
expenditures) outperform incubators that have to deal with budget 
constraints.222 
 Accordingly, the top managers of each Incubator should be 
expected to work with the entrepreneurs to line up investments from 
other private and public sources representing roughly 15% of each 
portfolio company’s approved budget.223 Getting private capital to 
supplement the government investment will increase the total capital 
introduced into the market, as well as provide networking opportunities 
for the portfolio companies, which may result in follow-on investments 
in the companies from such sources. As discussed below, the project 
managers of the firms in the incubators should also be expected to 
contribute funds, property, or sweat equity. 
6.     Other Governmental Actors and their Roles 
 Governmental actors can perform various tasks. Regional, state, 
and federal governments can generally be expected to provide R&D 
grants and other funding. Various agencies, such as the DoD, 
Department of Commerce (DOC), HHS, and Department of Labor, may 
be called upon to oversee and help carry out initiatives and projects 
 
 221 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 8 (“[T]his research suggests 
that some level of public sector investment contributes to greater incubator outcomes in terms 
of job creation, graduation rates, etc.”). 
 222 According to Lewis, Harper-Anderson, and Molnar:  
Programs with more financial resources have more capacity to deliver critical client 
services and are more stable. However, the sources of incubation program revenues 
and the ways the incubator uses these resources also are important. This study found 
that incubators receiving a larger portion of revenues from rent and service fees 
perform better than other programs. On the expenditure side, the more programs 
invest in staffing and program delivery—relative to building maintenance or debt 
servicing—the higher the probability of improved client outcomes. 
Id. at 9. 
 223 “ARPA almost always requires 50 percent cost-matching for ‘other transactions.’” 
Kuyath, supra note 34, at 533. “[T]he 50 percent cost-matching requirement can be a deterrent 
to companies participating in government-funded research, particularly if the company is a 
nonprofit or small business concern and lacks the financial resources to match costs.” Id. 
Accordingly, we recommend the lower percentage successfully required by the Israeli incubator 
model. 
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funded by regional, state, or federal governments whereas economic 
development companies will usually represent the local government. 
Any government entity may serve as a future client or supplier for 
portfolio firms in the Incubator at prices tied to fair market value. 
 The following are four additional significant roles that government 
can play, as suggested by economists Muro and Katz.224 First, federal 
policymakers can provide Incubator stakeholders around the nation 
with information and foundational resources.225 This implies that the 
managers of the Incubators should recruit the involvement of federal 
agencies, and, in particular, the following: DOC (particularly, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology); DoD; Education (ED); 
Energy (DOE); NASA; and the National Science Foundation (NSF). 
 Second, at the state level, policymakers should strategically invest 
resources in life science clusters and encourage regional collaboration.226 
Regional clusters are defined as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field,” which 
include “governmental and other institutions.”227 The state government 
 
 224 MARK MURO & BRUCE KATZ, THE NEW “CLUSTER MOMENT”: HOW REGIONAL 
INNOVATION CLUSTERS CAN FOSTER THE NEXT ECONOMY 5 (2010), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0921_clusters_muro_katz.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7DB5-2G53] (“[S]trong clusters foster innovation through dense knowledge flows 
and spillovers”). The different government stakeholders should align their efforts horizontally 
in addition to “vertically”:  
The cluster paradigm can—and should—be used to organize the disconnected policy 
offerings of any one level of government in service of clusters’ needs in a region, but 
it also provides a framework for coordinating them up and down the tiers of 
federalism to avoid policy conflict, redundancy, or missed opportunities for synergy. 
Id. at 7. 
 225 Id. at 7–8 (“Going forward, the federal government should move aggressively to build the 
information base necessary for cluster activity and policymaking; create effective forums for 
best practice sharing; enhance the capacity of regional cluster intermediaries with planning and 
other assistance; employ cluster paradigms on major national challenges; coordinate disparate 
cluster-relevant programs; and ensure the overarching cluster effort is visibly prominent”). 
 226 Id. at 8 (“States can make clusters a central component of economic development 
planning; target investments strategically to clusters of state significance; and adjust 
metropolitan governance to ease regional collaboration”). 
 227 Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 77, https://hbr.org/1998/11/clusters-and-the-new-economics-of-
competition; see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990); 
Hal Wolman & Diana Hincapie, Clusters and Cluster-Based Development: A Literature Review 
and Policy Discussion 2–3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished working paper), https://gwipp.gwu.edu/
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should encourage university-industry partnerships to leverage federal 
and academic research funds, to build a technically educated workforce, 
and to ease regulations to create a more fertile ground for technology. 
 Third, regional leaders should coordinate all the cluster 
participants and identify the various challenges facing clusters in that 
region.228 Finally, local policymakers will need to implement the 
strategic cluster-oriented economic development policy, as well as help 
gauge the clusters’ effectiveness and their possible expansion.229 By 
working together, federal, regional, and local governments can foster the 
creation of ecosystems of excellence.230 
7.     Management 
 The DHCI requires two sets of managers—a top program manager 
(or top management team)231 for each Incubator and a project manager 
(or project management team) for each portfolio company. Both the top 
program managers and the top project managers would report to the 
steering committee (discussed in the next Section). 
a.     Selecting the Top Program Managers for the Incubators 
 The Incubators could be managed in one of two ways—by internal 
executive managers hired to manage the program or by external trusted 
partners or intermediaries that contract to perform the top management 
function. Regardless of the selection process, the top program managers 
of the incubators would be tasked with facilitating the collaboration and 




 228 MURO & KATZ, supra note 224, at 8 (“Regional intermediaries should work to identify 
and describe local clusters, identify their binding constraints, and facilitate regional joint action 
to implement needed exchanges and initiatives.”). 
 229 Id. (recommending that local policy makers “should manage zoning and permitting 
issues to benefit the physical infrastructure in which clusters exist, and they should keep an eye 
out for the broader demographic and social context in which new industry clusters might form 
and to which existing ones must adjust”). 
 230 See text infra accompanying notes 277–87. 
 231 In this Section we use the terms “top manager,” “executive manager,” and “top 
management team” interchangeably unless the context indicates otherwise. 
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i.     Selecting Internal Executive Program Managers 
 The CHIB or an existing agency, such as DARPA, could hire 
internal executive program managers for each Incubator. Prospective 
executive managers would be required to compete for the right to 
participate in the DHCIIs.232 To the extent that such matters have not 
otherwise been specified by the relevant government agency in its 
request for OTA proposals, applicants for the position of top program 
manager would be expected to address the following in their bids. 
 First, they should state which industry sectors they believe should 
be represented and identify the incubator’s potential clients (that is, the 
entrepreneurs and firms that are likely to want to participate in the 
program). They should describe the potential clients’ level of 
development233 and evaluate their level of management skills. 
 Second, they should specify the region they believe is best suited to 
physically house the incubator and explain their selection criteria. 
Factors to be considered include whether the proposed region is a 
technology or non-technology-oriented region; whether it is considered 
a central or peripheral geographic area; and what is the industrial 
capacity of the region.234 It is further proposed that the Incubators 
 
 232 See Fannie Chen, Note, Structuring Public-Private Partnerships: Implications from the 
“Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Securities”, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 509 
(2013) (“[B]uilding a process whereby private parties compete for participation in a [private-
public partnership] through an auction-like mechanism can help government actors to 
accurately gauge the level of private sector risk-aversion ex ante and calibrate the optimal 
amount of financial incentive needed to attract private sector participation.”). 
 233 See About SBIR, supra note 104 (the SBIR guidelines, Phase I definition, and eligibility for 
funding provide: “The objective of Phase I is to establish the technical merit, feasibility, and 
commercial potential of the proposed R/R&D efforts and to determine the quality of 
performance of the small business awardee organization prior to providing further Federal 
support in Phase II. SBIR Phase I awards normally do not exceed $150,000 total costs for 6 
months.”). 
 234 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76. Lewis et al. found:  
Incubator management practices are better predictors of incubator performance than 
the size or growth of the region’s employment or GDP. Only the aggregate host 
region employment in 2007 was a strong predictor of any incubator outcome—
change in affiliate firm FTE from 2003 to 2008. . . . Compared with incubator quality 
variables, regional capacity variables have less predictive power. Among the regional 
capacity measures studied, only the proxies for urbanization, work force skills, 
availability of locally controlled capital, and higher educational attainment have 
moderate influence on incubator client outcomes. 
Id. at 9. 
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should be sited in ecosystems of excellence that offer affordable and 
comfortable housing in order to attract talent. 
 Third, the applicants should identify the various stakeholders and 
potential sponsors (and partners) in the region and explain how they 
vary in terms of resources, missions, and requirements. 
 When selecting the program managers for the Incubators, the 
CHIB (or other government agency) should consider the reputation and 
experience of the managerial candidates, particularly with regard to the 
region in question; the industries (or research) that the agency would 
like to promote; the applicant’s experience with seed investments, 
developing entrepreneurs and helping them convert their ideas into 
viable firms; and the applicant’s ability to marshal additional 
investments and resources from local and regional stakeholders. The 
vetting and bidding process could also take into account the maximum 
amount of capital that the proposed executive program manager (or 
management group) would be willing to invest in the Incubator’s 
portfolio companies and the equity or executive compensation expected 
in return, as well as the size of Incubator that the applicant seeks to 
establish. 
 The program managers will be paid a base salary for the managerial 
services that they provide, in addition to a certain equity stake in the 
portfolio companies (as equity compensation, in return for a cash 
investment in the portfolio company, or both).235 The percentage of 
equity will be determined by the steering committee and will take into 
account private industry practice (not public government practice or 
wage standards), the region, and the fields of R&D. The Incubators’ 
program managers will also be subject to the oversight of the private 
market, because if the portfolio firms are successful in the future and 
complete an acquisition or an initial public offering, then the managers 
will be compensated when the value of their equity stake increases. 
ii.     Selecting Trusted Partners or Intermediaries to Serve as Top 
Program Managers 
 Alternatively, the federal government could use the relevant 
agency’s OTA to contract with trusted partners and third-party 
intermediaries. Many of the criteria used for selecting trusted partners 
and intermediaries are similar to those applicable to candidates for an 
 
 235 See sources cited infra note 264. 
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internal executive position. They include expertise vetting potential 
projects and ensuring that the cooperation, coordination, exchange of 
information, incentives, operational pieces, quality controls, and ethics 
and compliance systems necessary for a successful incubator are in 
place. Trusted partners and intermediaries will, like internal candidates, 
be expected to respond to a request for proposals, but their applications 
will not be nearly as extensive as what applicants for internal executive 
positions are required to submit. In addition, trusted partners and 
intermediaries will not be required to invest any of their own funds. 
They would, however, have the option of acquiring an equity stake in a 
specific portfolio company on terms acceptable to the project manager 
and the steering committee unless such an investment would create 
conflicts of interest. 
b.     Selection of Project Managers of Portfolio Companies 
 The process for selecting the project manager for a proposed 
portfolio company is extremely important.236 When entrepreneurs are 
applying to join an Incubator, they will be required to provide a detailed 
account of their management experience and their perceived need for 
hiring others to serve on the top management team for the firm created 
to undertake the proposed project. The program manager of the 
Incubator for which an entrepreneur is applying will take this 
information into account when deciding whether to accept a project. 
Under certain circumstances, approval may be conditioned on a 
different project manager or an augmented project management team. 
c.     Business Plans for the Incubators and Portfolio Company 
Operations 
 Subject to approval by the CHIB (or other authorized government 
agency) acting pursuant to its OTA, the top program managers of the 
Incubators will be expected to set forth in a business plan or similar 
document clear (and well-defined) mission statements, investment 
processes, and goals for the Incubator, including a robust schedule of 
the fees that will be payable by the portfolio companies for the rental of 
 
 236 See LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 9 (“The findings provide 
empirical evidence that business incubation best practices are positively correlated to incubator 
success. Specifically, practices related to the composition of advisory boards, hiring qualified 
staffs that spend sufficient time with clients, and tracking incubator outcomes result in more 
successful incubation programs, clients, and graduates.”). 
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facilities and equipment and the provision of other services, such as 
hazardous waste removal. The plan should also address the items 
required in the applications for executive program managers discussed 
above. Ultimately, the Incubator program manager will be expected to 
work with the most promising project applicants to help them craft a 
brief business plan (or pitch deck) for their proposed project. That 
business plan should meld the Incubator’s program plan and the 
proposed project description in the participating entrepreneur’s 
application into project specifications acceptable to the governing 
agency and the steering committee.  
 Once the government agency and the steering committee approve 
the project specifications, it is critical for the Incubator managers to 
ensure that the portfolio companies have project managers who are 
largely autonomous, as is the case with DARPA projects. Subject to 
approval by the steering committee, the top managers of the firms in the 
Incubators should have the authority to set goals, supervise staff, and 
take other appropriate steps to limit and mitigate the dangers of political 
pressures and abuse.237 
 The Incubators’ program managers should, however, encourage 
the project managers and other stakeholders to promote collaboration 
between academic and industry researchers and scientists, given the key 
roles institutions of higher learning and research institutes play in a 
knowledge economy.238 These include doing the basic and applied 
research necessary to understand various natural and technical 
phenomena and thereby contributing to the development of innovative 
commercial solutions. Academic partners can also provide guidance to 
the businesses fostered by the Incubator and help provide the tacit 
knowledge often necessary for successful commercialization. In 
addition, academic institutions are often well-suited to addressing the 
particular needs of the core industries in the region where the academic 
 
 237 See Sean Silverthorne, Government’s Positive Role in Kick-Starting Entrepreneurship, 
HARV. BUS. SCH. (Dec. 7, 2009), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6318.html [https://perma.cc/S7RS-
9SKF]. 
 238 See NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 47–
48; NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND 
INTERACTIVE LEARNING 1–2 (Bengt-Åke Lundvall ed., 2010) (discussing the knowledge 
economy and noting that a national system of innovation is social and dynamic); SYSTEMS OF 
INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Charles Edquist ed., 1997); 
see also Larédo & Mustar, supra note 85. 
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laboratories and other facilities are located. The Incubators’ managers 
should also encourage open innovation,239 shared-use facilities, and 
technology transfer from the participating research institutions to firms 
capable of converting basic and applied science into marketable 
products and services or manufacturing processes. 
8.     Steering Committee 
 Each Incubator will have a steering committee which, according to 
the Israeli experience, would typically be chaired by the executive 
manager of the Incubator’s management group.240 The steering 
committee should include a technology transfer specialist; an executive 
from an incubator graduate firm;241 accounting, intellectual property 
(patent assistance), and general legal experts;242 representatives from 
research institutions and academia; industry representatives; local 
government and economic development agency officials;243 and 
representatives from any other stakeholders involved with the 
incubator.244  
9.     Key Elements of the Public-Private Partnership Management 
Contract 
 The relationship among the various participants in an Incubator 
will typically be memorialized in a public-private partnership 
agreement. To increase the likelihood of success, all parties should do 
their best to couple a mutual relationship of trust predicated on honesty, 
 
 239 Henry Chesbrough, adjunct professor and faculty director of the Center for Corporate 
Innovation at the University of California’s Haas School of Business, coined the term “open 
innovation.” HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING 
AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY xxiv (2005). According to Chesbrough, “Open Innovation 
is a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, 
and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology.” Id. 
 240 SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3. 
 241 LEWIS, HARPER-ANDERSON & MOLNAR, supra note 76, at 7–8. 
 242 Id. 
 243 See id. at 8 (stating that local government and economic development officials “play key 
roles in enhanced client firm performance, as their presence ensures that the incubator is 
embedded in the community, which is necessary for its success. . . . [They] also help educate 
critical funding sources about the incubation program and its successes.”). 
 244 SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3. 
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integrity, transparency, and fair dealing with a long-form contract that 
ensures that the proper incentives are in place.245 Commons theory 
posits that private arrangements can be effective to govern shared 
resources such as information and data.246 In this respect, our proposal 
incorporates aspects of the work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom on a 
commons framework whereby consortia can share certain data pursuant 
to contracts that structure their interactions by taking into account the 
knowledge and information resources that they create and exploit.247 
Unlike the nongovernmental governance structure for commons 
contemplated by Ostrom, however, our proposal includes aspects of the 
Information Commons contemplated by the 21st Century Cures Act, 
and it contemplates that the government will be one of the contracting 
parties and confer economically efficient intellectual property rights.248 
 
 245 See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 396 (“The prisoners’ dilemma shows that the 
parties, acting alone, will self-optimize. A well-crafted and fully enforceable [public-private 
partnership] contract can help prevent self-optimization and instead promote joint 
optimization and efficient allocation of added value.”). 
 246 See Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical 
Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1 (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett 
M. Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017). 
 247 Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom is known for “her analysis of economic governance.” 
Kelsey Sharpe, UCLA Alumna Elinor Ostrom Wins 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, UCLA (Oct. 
12, 2009), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/ucla-alumna-elinor-ostrom-wins-111209 [https://
perma.cc/S7ZE-4YD2]. She demonstrated how common property (such as forests, fisheries, or 
oil fields) can be successfully managed by the groups using it, without government 
intervention. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also Elinor Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A 
Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A 
COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 41 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007). For 
more on commons approach, see Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 
(2010); Robert P. Merges, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
793 (2010). See also Elinor Ostrom, The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and 
the Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 807 (2010); Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the 
Road to Medical Commons, supra note 246. 
 248  As Nobel Laureate Paul Romer explained: 
If we had a field, a pasture, and we let everybody use it for free, we know what 
happens. You get the tragedy of the common pasture. It gets overused. You get 
congestion. You get waste[.] But there’s no tragedy of the intellectual commons. 
There’s no overuse or congestion from having everybody use an idea once it’s 
discovered. 
Tiffany Jeung, Paul Romer: How the Economics Nobel Prize Winner Unlocked World 
Innovation, INVERSE (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/49702-paul-romer-
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 To promote trust and cooperation and reduce the risk of defection, 
the contract should include clauses to the following effect: 
(1) The parties shall together pursue a strategic alliance by 
joint initiatives and optimization for the benefit of the 
project. The parties recognize that achieving joint 
optimization requires specific legal clauses. 
(2) The parties agree to fulfill their obligations in 
accordance with the agreed binding clauses setting forth 
the common goals and the value added by joint 
optimization. 
(3) The parties agree to work and conduct research 
together in the spirit of the project with openness, trust, 
and collaboration. 
(4) A copy of the contract shall remain on the table in the 
lab. The parties shall use the contract on a daily basis and 
educate the involved staff, researchers, and legal back office 
in a joint optimization spirit. The parties acknowledge that 
the contract is a necessary tool to create added value. 
(5) The parties shall take the steps necessary to optimize 
the value of the project. Accordingly, all parties have the 
obligation to warn each other of any error, omission, or 
discrepancy of which they become aware and shall 
immediately propose solutions designed to jointly optimize 
the successful completion of the project. 
(6) It is a requirement that all relevant information be 
made available to all parties because it generates 
transparency, trust, and confidence. Accordingly, all parties 
shall open up their books and calculations concerning the 
project. 
 
economics-nobel [https://perma.cc/R6QB-DLS3] (quoting a 2007 interview to EconTalk). 
Indeed, “‘[t]he more we know, the easier it gets to discover.’” Hilary Brueck, Economist Paul 
Romer Just Won the Nobel Prize in Economics—and His Ideas Sound Like the Backbone of Bill 
Gates’ Philanthropy Playbook, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:42 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/paul-romer-nobel-prize-in-economics-endogenous-growth-theory-
2018-10 [https://perma.cc/GZQ5-Z7RA]. Because a “society never runs out of ideas,” others 
“will inevitably leapfrog over the sitting king [holding the patent on an idea], pushing the 
boundaries of technology forward while resetting the monopoly. So with more money invested 
and more frogs preparing to jump, discovery and economic progress quickens.” Jeung, supra. 
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(7) The parties must ensure each other a healthy business 
case and optimal research conditions and recognize that 
they have different economic yields from the project. 
(8) Due to the above clauses, the parties shall establish, 
develop, and implement a strategic alliance relationship in 
the lab and other shared facilities with the objectives of 
achieving: 
(a) Mutual cooperation, openness, and trust 
(b) Joint research 
(c) Common goals 
(d) An understanding of each other’s values and the 
joint value of the project 
(e) Innovation 
(f) Improved efficiency and optimization of the 
project 
(9) Delivery in accordance with Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) and timetables. Any research, added 
value, risk, pain, and gain identified by the parties shall be 
subject to incentive payments. 
(10) The parties shall investigate all possible positive 
incentives to fulfill the value-added transaction. The parties 
shall be awarded for and encouraged to maximize their 
effort for the benefit of the project and to allocate the added 
value in accordance with the key factors in paragraphs (8) 
and (9). 
(11) Any dispute shall be resolved as soon as possible and 
the parties shall apply the following specific strategic 
alliance guideline: When a problem arises, the first 
responsible director shall gather the parties and, based on 
the objectives set forth in the contract, launch a procedure 
to solve the problem. If the problem persists, the next 
director in the hierarchy shall be given responsibility for 
the problem; then, if necessary, a mediator and finally an 
arbitrator shall be appointed. At every stage, the above 
points shall be observed. All parties recognize that even 
when they experience conflict, common goals and 
optimization lead to added value for the project.249 
 
 249 Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 16, at 396–97 (with minor changes in wording). 
 
Bagley.Beck.40.2.7 (Do Not Delete) 1/17/2019  6:14 PM 
2018] P RE P A R IN G  FO R T H E  A PO C A L YPS E  889 
10.     Selection and Evaluation of Projects and Portfolio Companies 
 The Incubator’s management team, including the executive 
director and other professional advisors, will propose to the steering 
committee one or more (depending on the size and capital of the 
Incubator) projects or portfolio companies to participate in the 
Incubator.250 Once the steering committee has approved a project or 
portfolio company, the CHIB will be responsible for making the final 
decision on which projects and companies will participate in the 
program and receive funding. Before making its final determination, the 
CHIB will, absent exigent circumstances, be expected to obtain peer 
review of the proposals, as happens now with both NIH and IMI grants, 
and to request additional advice from independent experts, depending 
on the industry and research objectives.251 To ensure that only truly 
innovative projects are approved, regardless of the publishing history or 
established reputation of the inventor, we advocate following the 
process developed by Thomas Sinkjær, whereby each member of the 
review committee is given a “golden ticket” that can be used to green-
light a project even if it is not approved by the other members of the 
review committee.252 
 To be accepted into the program, the project (business, technical, 
or scientific idea) must be innovative, based on sound R&D, and capable 
of being commercialized and exported to the appropriate market. The 
industry scope is the core activity or common denominator that links 
 
Certain “add-on” contract clauses promote long-term, Pareto optimal collaborations 
between pharmaceutical companies and universities in the research discovery phase, 
the stage in the value chain at which a strategic alliance can create benefits for both 
the university and the pharmaceutical business. For example, positive incentive 
clauses ensure that both parties have an incentive to add value for each other. They 
create a bigger pie and a more efficient allocation of the slices through the 
articulation of common goals, shared value creation, and joint optimization. 
Id. at 396; see also Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical Commons, 
supra note 246; Strandburg et al., The Knowledge Commons Framework, supra note 246. 
 250 For a discussion of the Israeli Incubator Model, see SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157. 
 251 See id. at 3. 
 252 Thomas Sinkjær, Fund Ideas, Not Pedigree, to Find Fresh Insight, 555 NATURE 143, 143 
(2018) (“Anonymous applications free scientists to make bold proposals, and ‘golden tickets’ 
free reviewers to bet on them.”). 
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the participating actors.253 An Incubator may concentrate on a specific 
sector, such as biotechnology or defense needs, but under certain 
circumstances the managers might be encouraged to go beyond the 
industry scope and support different projects from various industries. 
 A general objective of the DHCI is to encourage the adoption of 
the stakeholder approach to strategic management,254 which is intended 
to give managers a framework within which to deal with constant 
changes in the environment, society, technology, and industry.255 
Accordingly, the Incubator managers will be able to actively design a 
new direction for the Incubator,256 as needed to take into account how 
the Incubator can affect the environment, in addition to how the 
environment may affect the Incubator,257 subject to the approval of the 
steering committee and CHIB.  
 The managers should be free to select projects that might take a 
long time to produce results because they will not be subject to the 
threat of losing their jobs if the projects do not produce short-term 
results and profits.258 Such emphasis on investment in long-term R&D 
 
 253 See generally THOMAS ANDERSSON ET AL., THE CLUSTER POLICIES WHITEBOOK (2004), 
http://www.tci-network.org/uploads/media/CKC/0001/03/245afe2fcf683b3b2fcaf803cabc80795
f2ff0fe.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q53D-2J6Y]. 
 254 See R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic 
Management (Darden Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Univ. of Va., Working Paper No. 01-02, 
2001), http://faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholderapproach.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D5NQ-AG6L]. 
The impetus behind stakeholder management was to try and build a framework that 
was responsive to the concerns of managers who were being buffeted by 
unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and change. Traditional strategy 
frameworks were neither helping managers develop new strategic directions nor were 
they helping them understand how to create new opportunities in the midst of so 
much change. As Freeman observed “[O]ur current theories are inconsistent with 
both the quantity and kinds of change that are occurring in the business environment 
of the [1980s] . . . . A new conceptual framework is needed.” A stakeholder approach 
was a response to this challenge. 
Id. 
 255 See id. (“The purpose of stakeholder management was to devise methods to manage the 
myriad groups and relationships that resulted in a strategic fashion.”). 
 256 SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157. 
 257 See Freeman & McVea, supra note 254. 
 258 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 72 (2012). 
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will provide current and future generations with the ability to enjoy the 
wealth generated from the innovative projects.259 
 Each of the projects in the Incubator program should be evaluated 
on a yearly basis.260 If a project is running over budget or behind 
schedule or otherwise not meeting expectations, then the program 
manager should give the portfolio company management a reasonable 
time to get it back on track. If the program manager or CHIB is still not 
satisfied after the portfolio company’s management has been given an 
opportunity to meet expectations then either the program manager or 
CHIB should have the power to terminate the project, with all 
intellectual property rights not already licensed to third parties reverting 
to the portfolio company. 
11.     Management Incentives to Prevent Adverse Selection, Conflicts of 
Interest, Shirking, and Political Capture 
 To avoid “waste” (i.e., management getting paid by the government 
no matter how well the projects do) and political capture (i.e., 
management being pressured by local stakeholders to accept friends, 
relatives, or political allies into programs or to otherwise take actions 
not in the best interests of the Incubator),261 the following incentives are 
 
 259 See Stout, supra note 214, at 707–08. Stout gave examples of the ways in which the results 
of research and development by large public corporations have benefited current and future 
generations:  
IBM and AT&T likely incurred very high levels of “wasteful” agency costs while 
operating their Big Blue and Bell Labs research divisions during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Nevertheless, those costs have been repaid many times over by the gains to multiple 
generations of shareholders (and others) from developing the computer and the 
transistor. Similarly, multiple future generations may benefit enormously from 
current corporate projects to develop self-driving cars, commercial space transport, 
and algal biofuels. 
Id.  
 260 See generally SHEFER & FRENKEL, supra note 157, at 3. 
 261 See Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 133, 141 (1998) 
(arguing that “[g]overnments throughout the world have long directed benefits to their political 
supporters, whether in the form of jobs at above-market wages or outright transfers”).  
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designed to encourage the management to be diligent in selecting the 
companies that will join the Incubator portfolio.262 
 First, the management of the Incubator must be autonomous so it 
can set clear and well-defined strategic long-term goals for running the 
Incubator. Its duties will include supervising the funding from the 
various stakeholder groups, and providing accelerator- and venture 
capital-like support services to the portfolio companies, such as assisting 
in the development of the R&D and commercialization strategy; helping 
to prepare the business plan and the pitch deck; introducing the 
entrepreneurs to members of the Incubator management’s network, 
including potential mentors, investors, collaborators, and customers; 
and providing clerical services, organizational analysis, and legal and 
accounting guidance.263 Additionally, to accelerate the formation and 
growth of the seed companies, the management will need to integrate 
education and workforce training functions into the Incubator’s 
operations, which is where academia and the research community can 
also play important roles. 
 Second, based on lessons learned from the Israeli experience and 
following the recent successful market trend of the accelerator model, 
the management of the Incubator should be expected to invest a certain 
amount of their own capital in the portfolio companies, in cash or as 
sweat equity, in return for an equity stake in the companies.264 Managers 
who have invested their own capital in the portfolio Incubator 
companies will have a stake in making sure that they do not pick 
 
 262 Capture problems can be reduced by “passing the funds onto intermediaries such as 
venture capital funds that make the real investment decisions. By keeping individual awards 
relatively modest, they limit efforts to misdirect these funds.” Silverthorne, supra note 237. 
 263 For an excellent description of the types of support accelerators typically provide and 
their effect on start-ups’ success, see Cohen et al., supra note 150. See also MURO & KATZ, supra 
note 224, at 7 (“Clustering is a dynamic of the private economy in the presence of public goods. 
Cluster strategy should be pursued with humility as a matter of supporting, connecting, filling 
gaps, and removing obstacles to private enterprise while making sure certain public and quasi-
public goods are available.”).  
 264 For example, the accelerator program AlphaLab, a nationally-ranked start-up accelerator 
program based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, receives 4% common stock in the companies it 
invests in, in return for a $25,000 investment in each company from Innovation Works 
(AlphaLab’s parent organization), plus space and services. FAQ, ALPHALAB, http://
alphalab.org/faq (last visited Oct. 6, 2018); see also Cohen et al., supra note 150, at 6 
(accelerators typically invest $15,000 to $20,000 in exchange for 6–8% of the new venture’s 
equity). 
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“lemons.”265 Having an equity stake also reduces the dangers of 
management shirking266 and not acting in the best interests of the 
companies and their investors.267 It may also lessen the effects of 
political pressures from the government agencies involved. 
12.     Open Innovation and the Creation and Governance of a 
Commons 
 The DHCI is based on the “open-innovation”268 and “commons”269 
paradigms, which enable the participating early-stage firms in the 
Incubator to use internal and external ideas to develop their 
biotechnology, product, or process, as well as to take advantage of the 
shared-use facilities. Firms using open innovation are able to leverage 
the basic research that was done by other firms while exploiting both 
external and internal sources of innovation,270 thereby reducing the cost 
of carrying out R&D271 and increasing the likelihood of developing 
products or services that would otherwise not exist or would remain 
 
 265 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECONOMICS 488, 493 (1970) (discussing the “adverse selection” problem, as 
well as firms’ offerings of equity that may be associated with the “lemons” problem); see also 
Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of 
Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 56; PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, 
THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 159 (2d ed. 2004). 
 266 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (“The problem of 
inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general. 
It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in 
firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and 
bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as are 
common in the performing arts and the market for real estate.”). 
 267 See LERNER, supra note 24, at 7. 
 268 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 239.  
 269 See generally Strandburg et al., supra note 246. 
 270 See Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Patterns of Open Innovation in Open Source Software, in 
OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 82 (Henry Chesbrough, Wim 
Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006) (arguing firms produce internal innovations (from 
internal knowledge), and various models have been developed in order to try and explain how 
firms can also exploit external knowledge). West and Gallagher state there are four sources of 
external knowledge: first, supplier and customer; second, university, government, and private 
laboratories; third, competitors; and fourth, other nations. Id. at 6 (citing ERIC VON HIPPEL, 
THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION (1988)). 
 271 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 239, at xxiv. 
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untapped in the economy.272 Both open innovation and the creation of 
an information commons encourage knowledge spillovers and 
collaboration among the participating firms and stakeholders. They can 
also facilitate the early incorporation of customers in the development 
process273 and boost the accuracy of customer targeting and market 
research. Finally, they increase the potential for viral marketing.274 Firms 
that have successfully used open innovation include Intel, Cisco, and 
Microsoft.275  
 If, however, there is proprietary information that a private firm will 
eventually want to patent or otherwise protect, then a trusted 
intermediary may be used to match up promising discoveries and needs 
without disclosing the proprietary information to a rival firm or 
institution. This is already being done with a high throughput program 
whereby promising small molecules or biologics owned by 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms are matched against pathogens and 
pathways or genes identified by academic scientists pursuant to 
cooperative R&D agreements. Alternatively, the OTA contract could 
specify that the government is the sole owner of the technology and has 
the sole right to use it. If, for example, the government decided to offer a 
$1 billion prize to the first firm to successfully develop an antibiotic 
effective against “superbugs,” the government would want to keep it as a 
drug of last resort to prevent the development of antibiotic-resistant 
 
 272 See also Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated 
Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 495 (2007); Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas, in 1B 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063, 1065–66 (Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf eds., 
2005). 
 273 According to Marais and Schutte, firms are struggling to find efficient ways to identify 
the wants and needs of their target market. Therefore, they should use practical and “realistic” 
product testing or prototypes. See STEPHAN MARAIS & CORNE SCHUTTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
OPEN INNOVATION MODELS TO ASSIST THE INNOVATION PROCESS 96 (2009). 
 274 See id. at 105–06; see also Stephan Marais, The Definition and Development of Open 
Innovation Models to Assist the Innovation Process 67 (March 2010) (unpublished MScEng 
thesis, University of Stellenbosch), http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/2891 [https://
perma.cc/ARV8-QGLC] (“Idea Bounty puts a lot of emphasis on marketing, not only to retain 
existing community members, but also to attract new members. As is the nature of the service 
offering, all marketing efforts are done through the use of Web 2.0 technologies—blogs, micro-
blogs and social networking sites.”). 
 275 See CHESBROUGH, supra note 239, at xxiv. 
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strains. In such a case, the drug might be manufactured by a large 
pharmaceutical firm but the government would be the sole customer.276 
13.     Ecosystems of Excellence 
 If our initiative is properly implemented, it should lead to the 
formation of “ecosystems of excellence,”277 sometimes called 
“clusters,”278 with the following positive results. First, it can foster 
geographic connections between the various regions where the 
Incubators are located.279 Second, it can boost new enterprise 
formation280 and help firms survive the Valley of Death281 by stimulating 
 
 276 Thanks to Jo Handelsman, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute Professor and the 
Frederick Phineas Rose Professor of Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology at Yale 
University, and the former Associate Director for Science, the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy during the Obama administration, for this example. 
 277 See Teece, supra note 24, at 104; see also Cohen, supra note 141; supra note 141 and 
accompanying text. An example of an ecosystem of excellence is the Cyber Center of Excellence 
in San Diego, California. It is “a non-profit dedicated to accelerating the region’s cyber 
economy and positioning it as a global hub of cyber innovation.” CYBER CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, 
ANNUAL REPORT: 2017 (2018), https://sdccoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CCOE_2017-
Annual-Report_DIGITAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QQ5-CMHK]. “The ecosystem includes 
incubators, financiers, experienced service providers and non-profits that support more than 
100 firms focused exclusively on cybersecurity. In addition, the proximity of research and 
development facilities to Northern Mexico’s manufacturing hub allows for the development of 
quick-to-market products.” CYBER CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, ACCELERATING THE CYBER 
INNOVATION ECONOMY 2 (2016), https://sdccoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/CCOE_
Brochure_v5.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P6Y -7MKB]. Multiple universities and colleges in the 
region engage in cutting-edge research in cybersecurity and train students for careers in 
cybersecurity, computer science, and engineering. Id. The Navy’s Space & Naval Warfare 
Systems Command is based in San Diego, and it awards more than $1.1 billion in private-
industry contracts annually to companies in the San Diego region, making its presence “a huge 
contributing factor for many companies to locate and stay in the region.” Id. See generally 
CYBER CTR. EXCELLENCE, https://sdccoe.org [https://perma.cc/KMB8-KANZ] (last visited Oct. 
4, 2018). 
 278 PORTER, supra note 227 (approximately twenty years ago, Michael Porter, a Harvard 
Business School professor, introduced and popularized the concept of “clusters”); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 248–53. 
 279 See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1993) (discussing the 
significance of geographical economics). 
 280 PORTER, supra note 227. 
 281 Id. See discussion on Valley of Death supra Part II. These small and young firms are often 
more open to a commons framework whereby consortia can share certain data pursuant to 
contracts that structure their interactions by taking into account the knowledge and 
information resources that they create and exploit. These new ideas also tend to have a greater 
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low-cost collaboration between early-stage companies and various 
stakeholders, including customers, employees, creditors, suppliers, and 
other non-shareholder groups, which will supply the enterprise with 
resources (such as funding, labor, expertise, infrastructure, and the 
like).282 Third, it can foster innovation and commercialization through 
dense knowledge flows and spillovers, including networking, data 
gathering, and sharing.283 Finally, it can foster competition and 
encourage firms to innovate.284 
 CHIB should be in charge of developing platforms that will allow 
the various Incubator program managers to meet; share their progress, 
difficulty, and achievements; and share their resources, so that they can 
create a public-private “National Network for Innovation Incubation” to 
successfully deal with natural or terror events in the future. During 
previous events of this sort, there were deficiencies in both the local 
public health response and the federal government’s ability to manage 
it.285 For example, in 2001, respondents complained that “they did not 
have all the necessary agreements in place to put the plans into 
operation rapidly,” ran into trouble reaching clinicians to provide them 
with guidance, and had not anticipated the number of entities with 
which they would have to communicate.286 
 We note that there is controversy concerning the issue of whether 
foreign companies or entrepreneurs should be able to participate in 
programs funded by American taxpayers. However, in today’s global 
 
chance of making their way into practice due to the greater flexibility and more direct exchange 
of ideas among the various levels of the managerial hierarchy in smaller firms. Therefore, our 
initiative incorporates aspects of the work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom on the commons. 
 282 See Stout, supra note 214, at 692 (definition of “stakeholders”). 
 283 See MURO & KATZ, supra note 224, at 5. Because cluster entities share an industrial focus, 
they tend to be in an excellent position to make use of knowledge and innovation relevant to an 
industry. PORTER, supra note 227. Absent the cluster, individual companies would lack access 
to certain information, such as market research and supply chain analysis. Id. 
 284 See MURO & KATZ, supra note 224, at 5; PORTER, supra note 227; see also Harald Bathelt 
et al., Clusters and Knowledge: Local Buzz, Global Pipelines and the Process of Knowledge 
Creation, 28 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 31, 36–37 (2004) (clusters strongly encourage and 
pressure companies to innovate both to stay competitive and to increase profitability). 
 285 See Temko, supra note 108, at 2–3, 6. For past example of failure to deal with the Anthrax 
incidents of 2001, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-152, BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC 
HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001 (2003) [hereinafter BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC 
HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001]. 
 286 BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, supra note 
285, at 1. 
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economy, such collaborations are necessary and even inevitable.287 
Therefore, international firms should be able to participate (as partners 
of American firms) unless their involvement would pose a threat to 
national security. 
IV.     CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
 There are many challenges associated with introducing change into 
an existing organization, especially a massive bureaucratic organization 
like the U.S. government or a complex system such as the patchwork of 
physicians, nurses, researchers, hospitals, clinics, insurers, and others 
responsible for the provision of healthcare in the United States.288 
A.     Reluctance to Deal with the Government 
 Individuals and companies in the private sector are often reluctant 
to sell to and collaborate with the government.289 Reasons include the 
federal government’s inflexible fight for control over intellectual 
property rights and software warranties;290 unreasonable, time-
consuming, and very costly delays in funding due to such things as shifts 
in government priorities and changing strategies and procurement 
needs;291 complex cost accounting requirements; and the “long, onerous 
and costly federal acquisition process.”292 According to one GAO report 
that compared the process of submitting proposals for sale to the 
government with submitting bids to private parties, it took one 
company twenty-five full-time employees, twelve months, and millions 
of dollars to prepare a bid for the government.293 In contrast, it took 
only three part-time employees, two months, and thousands of dollars 
to prepare the same bid for a private firm. 
 
 287 See discussion supra Section III.B.5 (discussing cross-regional collaboration with respect 
to the Israeli Incubator programs. 
 288 See Dorothy Leonard-Barton & William A. Kraus, Implementing New Technology, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Nov. 1985, at 102. 
 289 See Cooke, supra note 50.  
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
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 There are also cultural differences between the private industry, 
business, and government in general and with respect to public health in 
particular. There is a lack of familiarity with one another’s values, 
metrics, resources, constraints, lines of accountability, management 
styles, lingo, and modes of operation. Private parties often view 
government management styles as inefficient and wasteful. 
Entrepreneurs and business leaders are concerned about the need to 
follow misinformed or opaque government regulations. Public leaders 
in the public health area may see their role as constraining businesses 
from promoting unhealthy products, harming the environment, or 
threatening the health of workers and patients—not as taking risks to 
find new therapies or finding ways to fund all the compounds and 
biologics that never find their way to a patient. 
 But there is precedent for the public-private partnerships we 
propose, including the Manhattan Project and DARPA. The surprise 
attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, gave birth to the field of 
operations research as the country scrambled to arm and clothe its 
soldiers and build fleets of ships, submarines, tanks, and aircraft. Given 
the threats posed by CBRN attacks and diseases like influenza, we call 
on President Trump to order a review by operations research experts of 
how the FDA assesses and approves new drugs and medical devices. 
Queuing theory suggests that backlogs can be reduced by incremental 
increases in resources. The markets have already signaled what 
expedited FDA approval is worth; major pharmaceutical firms, which 
are often seeking approval of a “me-too drug” (one that is only slightly 
different from other drugs on the market), have paid hundreds of 
millions of dollars to acquire the transferable fast-track vouchers 
provided to the developers of cures for orphan diseases.294 
 We applaud the FDA’s willingness to consider accepting 
aggregated patient data, of the sort gathered by Flatiron Health, based 
on electronic health records to be used in lieu of expensive and time-
consuming clinical trials.295 This may be particularly appropriate when a 
 
 294 Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From 
Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71 (2017). 
Government prizes can also spur otherwise unprofitable private-sector innovation. See 
generally Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2016). 
 295 Lydia Ramsey, The FDA and a $1.2 Billion Startup Are Analyzing How Drugs Are Used 
After Approval—and it Could One Day Change How We Treat Cancer, BUS. INSIDER (June 2, 
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drug already approved for one clinical use is being considered for 
another (so-called repurposing). 
B.     Lack of a Unified Healthcare Infrastructure 
 Some (including certain members of Congress) maintain that the 
first BioShield initiative failed because the enabling act did not address 
the United States’ healthcare infrastructure problems. Our DCHI 
ameliorates this by calling for centralized collaboration and 
coordination between and among local, state, and federal authorities, 
universities and research institutes, public and private hospitals and 
medical centers, private industry, and nongovernmental organizations 
for the purpose of defending U.S. residents from CBRN attacks and 
naturally occurring diseases like antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Given the 
gravity and widespread nature of such threats, our hope is that our 
modest proposal will be able to withstand the partisan politics that have 
resulted in the partial dismemberment of the Affordable Care Act.296 
C.     Uncertainty, High-Risk, and Asymmetric Information Barriers 
 Uncertainty, high-risk, and asymmetric information barriers are 
associated with investing in early-stage pharmaceutical, medical device, 
and biotech firms.297 The markets for allocating risk capital to early 
stage ventures are inefficient.298 Private investors often cannot obtain 
adequate information about which inventions and companies are likely 
to succeed. It is particularly difficult to quantify market uncertainties 
when an innovation is radical and technologies and markets are 
constantly evolving, changing, and becoming ever more complex. Even 
venture capital investors, who are special financial intermediaries that 
have found a way to address at least some of these information 
challenges, have abandoned early-stage biotech investments in favor of 
 
2017, 10:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/flatiron-health-collaboration-with-fda-data-
at-asco-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/63MG-7TPM]. 
 296 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 297 See BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 94, at 5–6. 
 298 See id. 
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later stage investments,299 in part because they cannot capture the full 
benefits of such technologies.300 Additionally, many large public firms 
are closing or relocating their R&D labs to sites outside of the United 
States, and are shying away from “Moon Shot” investments in R&D 
initiatives with uncertain returns.301 
 The DHCI is designed to address many of these challenges by 
having the government intervene in the market, as it did after the Soviet 
Union launched Sputnik, by creating DARPA and giving it OTA to 
harness the power of the private sector and the university research 
community. Providing seed capital for public-private incubators that 
together form an ecosystem of excellence reduces at least some of the 
financial inefficiencies and helps bridge information gaps associated 
with investment in R&D. Perhaps, most importantly, it will serve as a 
catalyst for encouraging and stimulating the private development of 
innovative solutions (including funding early-stage companies) as 
happened with the Israeli Technology Incubator program. 
D.     Political Capture of Business Objectives 
 A primary argument for the privatization of state-owned firms or 
state-financed ventures has been the political capture of business 
purposes and objectives. Politicians concerned with being re-elected 
have a strong personal interest in making their constituents happy. 
Therefore, they have a tendency to push for more recruitment than 
 
 299 Joseph A. McCahery et al., Corporate Venture Capital: From Venturing to Partnering, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 211 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012), http://
www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195391596.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780195391596-e-7. 
 300 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development, 
in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., 
1996) (providing evidence that the social return to R&D is much above the private return); see 
Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. S29, S29–36 (1992) 
(evaluating calculations of the social rates of return for research and development); Margalioth, 
supra note 272, at 501, 512–13; BRANSCOMB & AUERSWALD, supra note 94, at 2–6. 
 301 This is due in part to ill-informed notions of “shareholder primacy,” which can deter 
large public companies from embarking on long-term strategic projects with uncertain returns. 
See generally STOUT, supra note 258. Managers may abstain from investing in risky innovation 
if they are under a constant threat of losing their jobs due to a change in both ownership and 
management. Id.; see also Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33–56 (Alan J. 
Auerbach ed., 1998), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c2052.pdf [https://perma.cc/49GR-GFQE]. 
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necessary in order to create jobs and spend more (in excess) than the 
private market would on an initiative,302 such as construction of a new 
public university campus. Moreover, politicians can also push for 
initiatives, projects, and corporations that will essentially be tools to 
transfer wealth to their supporters, partners, or relatives.303 This results 
in the misallocation of scarce government resources to the detriment of 
the taxpayer, as well as to those who would be better served by a more 
efficient process for funding innovation.304 Moreover, governments can 
elect to pay higher wages to government workers than are customary in 
the private market, which often surpass the public worker’s productivity 
level.305 
 We seek to address the risk of political capture by calling for largely 
independent and autonomous incubator management teams who have 
their own funds or sweat equity invested in the projects or portfolio 
companies being provided seed capital by the government. In addition, 
by following the successful Israeli example and requiring that at least 
15% of the necessary funding be provided by nongovernment sources, 
our proposal provides a form of market check on the choice of 
investments. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article calls on the U.S. government to enact policies for 
institutional innovation that will encourage public and private sector 
experimentation and collaboration by reducing bureaucracy and 
promoting sustainable relationships and open innovation, while 
preserving the possibility of obtaining the intellectual property rights 
that are usually required to give private industry the incentive to 
innovate and commercialize novel therapeutics and medical devices. 
Properly harnessing the resources of private industry, universities and 
research centers, and government, will, we submit, lead not only to 
 
 302 See Belloc, supra note 83, at 9–11. 
 303 See id. 
 304 See Shleifer, supra note 261, at 148, 142 (arguing for the “importance of ownership as the 
source of capitalist incentives to innovate” and that “state firms are inefficient not just because 
their managers have weak incentives to reduce costs, but because inefficiency is the result of the 
government’s deliberate policy to transfer resources to supporters”). 
 305 Giacomo Corneo & Rafael Rob, Working in Public and Private Firms, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 
1335 (2003). 
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improved readiness to respond to CBRN attacks and epidemics, but also 
to improvements in societal health and overall well-being. 
 In particular, we propose that Congress and the president enact 
and implement the Defense of Health Countermeasures Initiative, a 
multi-prong program that builds on the successes of DARPA and on the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, including 
their use of the federal government’s Other Transaction Authority to 
create a national network of public-private incubators governed by 
contracts306 of the sort currently used by participants in the European 
Union’s Innovative Medicines Initiative307 and by certain U.S. inventors, 
universities and research institutes, and for-profit firms working 
together with the NIH and other government funders under the Bayh-
Dole Act.308 Our initiative incorporates aspects of the work of Elinor 
Ostrom on a commons framework, whereby consortia can share certain 
data pursuant to contracts that structure their interactions by taking 
into account the knowledge and information resources that they create 
and exploit.309 However, unlike the nongovernmental governance 
structure for commons contemplated by Ostrom, our proposal includes 
aspects of the Information Commons contemplated by the 21st Century 
Cures Act, CARB-X, and DRIVe. To provide adequate incentives for 
private firms to participate, members of a consortium will have the 
ability to keep certain information and downstream inventions 
proprietary, by allocating the patent rights by contract, as contemplated 
by Nobel Laureate Paul Romer, or by disclosing them only to a trusted 
intermediary pursuant to a confidentiality agreement that preserves 
future patentability and licensing rights.  
 We assert that the DHCI will not only help to protect U.S. residents 
from CBRN attacks and naturally occurring deadly diseases, but will 
also promote economic growth and increase productivity by ensuring 
 
 306 See Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 14. 
 307 See id. at 400–01; Gaspar et al., supra note 21, at 984–86; see also How IMI Works, supra 
note 21. IMI works to “improve health by speeding up the development of innovative 
medicines, particularly in areas where there is an unmet medical or social, public health need.” 
Id. IMI facilitates “collaboration between the key players involved in healthcare research, 
including universities, the pharmaceutical and other industries, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), patient organisations, and medicines regulators.” Id. 
 308 For a list of legislation concerning innovation, see Block, supra note 34, at 179–80; see 
also Alon-Beck, supra note 23, at 284 n.78. 
 309 See Strandburg et al., Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical Commons, supra 
note 246, at 1–5; Strandburg et al., The Knowledge Commons Framework, supra note 246. 
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that U.S. biotechnology start-ups can successfully compete in 
tomorrow’s marketplace.310 We recognize that even this modest 
proposal will require policymakers to design and institute sweeping 
innovation policies that will embrace new approaches to management, 
technologies, and operating methods.311 Input and assistance from 
experts in academia, industry, and government will be needed to turn 
this skeletal proposal into the legislation, regulations, and contracts 
necessary to give our proposal life. Areas for further research and 
reflection include, but are not limited to: the application of the 
competition laws in the United States and the European Union to the 
partnerships, consortia, and networks we propose; government 
appropriations; interagency coordination; countermeasure 
prioritization; bilateral and multilateral opportunities for cooperation; 
the pricing mechanisms for inventions and equity funded through the 
DHCI; the appropriate use of government prizes and vouchers to spur 
innovation;312 and the provisions necessary to protect basic human 
rights, especially the right to privacy. At the risk of sounding grandiose, 
we hope that this Article will help further the dialogues and work 
necessary to effect real change. 
 
 310 See Porter & Kramer, supra note 69, at 4–6, 12. 
 311 Block, supra note 34; see also Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get 
in the Way of U.S. Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 128, 130–31 (2011) (stating that 
“policies that affect the innovation sector are frequently adopted as part of broader packages 
that have nothing to do with innovation”); Porter & Kramer, supra note 69, at 4–5, 7; KENT H. 
HUGHES, BUILDING THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 1–2 (2005). 
 312 See Burstein & Murray, supra note 294; see also Rutschman, supra note 294. 
